


This paper is essentially an abbreviated version of the author's Ph.D. thesis of the same title (Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972).



June 1974

R. P. No. 59
U.S. ISSN 0084-0815

RURAL LAND INVASIONS IN COLOMBIA

by

Roger E. Soles*

*Staff member, Inter-American Foundation.

All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions are those of the author and not necessarily those of supporting or cooperating agencies.

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Soles, Roger E

Rural land invasions in Colombia.

By Roger E. Soles. Madison, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1974.

66 p. tables. 28 cm. (R.P. no. 59)

1. Agriculture--Economic aspects--Colombia. 2. Colombia--Rural conditions. 3. Land tenure--Colombia. I. Title (Series: Wisconsin. University. Land Tenure Center. Research papers. no. 59) HD516.S65

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Colombia has had a considerable history of rural conflict and peasant land invasions, beginning in the 1930s, continuing through "la violencia" of the 1940s and 1950s, into the invasions of the 1960s and early 1970s. The locus of these conflicts has shifted from the coffee producing areas of Cundinamarca and Tolima to the northern coastal departments (especially Sucre, Bolivar, Cesar, and Cordoba). I am concerned with the fundamental question: what conditions provoke peasants to risk their lives in an illegal occupation of privately held (or claimed) lands? I will examine in this paper three major variables--the density of population, the land tenure system, and the distribution of capital--which may answer this question for Colombia, analyze these variables as they pertain to municipios (roughly "counties") which were the site of land invasions, and describe the process of several such invasions.

I. POPULATION, LAND, AND CAPITAL

Population

Between 1938 and 1964, Colombia's population increased from 8,701,816 to 17,484,508. That is, in 26 years, it more than doubled.¹ During the last 13-year intercensal period (1951-1964), the annual population growth rate approached 3.2 percent.² The cities, of course, grew at a considerably higher annual rate (5.6 percent) due to rural-to-urban migration adding to a fairly high biological increase.³ The proportion of Colombia's population living in urban areas increased from 30.9 percent in 1931 to 38.7 percent in 1951 and to over 52 percent in 1964.⁴

1. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), XIII Censo Nacional de Población, 15 de Julio de 1964: Resumen General (Bogotá, 1967), p. 31.

2. Ibid., p. 30. This rate of growth may be an overestimate due to underenumeration of the 1951 census. See T. P. Schultz, Population Growth and Internal Migration in Colombia, prepared for USAID (Santa Monica, California: the Rand Corporation, 1969). Consequently, all of the following figures must be considered with some degree of leniency, although the variations are not of too great a magnitude to nullify the following analysis.

3. See W. L. Flinn, "Rural to Urban Migration: The Colombian Case," Land Tenure Center Research Paper no. 19 (Madison, Wisconsin: Land Tenure Center, 1966).

4. DANE, XIII Censo Nacional de Población. The division here between urban and rural population follows the methodology employed by the Census--that of using the cabecera (county seat) as "urban" and the rest of the municipio as "rural." The cabecera is almost always the largest town within a municipio and while there may well be smaller villages within the municipio, it is safe to generalize that these are predominantly agriculturally oriented.

However, while the rural population is declining in relative percentage terms, it continues to grow at the rate of 1.3 percent annually, and in absolute terms from 6 million in 1938 to 7 million in 1954 to 8.4 million in 1964.⁵ Adult population (fifteen years and older) in rural areas increased by one quarter of a million in the first intercensal period and by over one half of a million during the latter.

This 1.3 percent growth rate in rural population added over a million persons to the rural sector of Colombia between 1951 and 1964. In the northern coastal departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Cordoba, and Magdalena, the rural population grew at an annual rate of 3.46 percent--more than twice the national average for the rural populace. (See Table 1.) This resulted in a 55.5 percent increase in the rural population for this region in the 13-year interval as compared to only an 18 percent average increase in the other departments. These coastal increases, principally from persons born locally rather than from in-migration, were not met by increases in availability of agricultural land. Therefore, while the coastal departments were quiet in terms of rural unrest in the early 1950s when the rest of Colombia was in the throes of "la violencia," they were also at that time relatively less densely populated than the other departments. (See Table 2.) But by the mid-1960s, the coastal land-man ratios had decreased by over 50 percent, whereas the other departments experienced only a 7 percent decline; and in terms of arable land per person, the costeños were close to 25 percent below the other departments. (See Table 3.) These growing rural populations and rapidly declining land-man ratios, coupled with the fact that less public "escape valve" land was available in the coastal departments, are prominent factors in explaining why these departments were the focal area of rural land invasions in Colombia in the 1960s.

Land

In assessing the role which availability of land may play in rural conflict, two considerations are important: the distribution of ownership or control over land, and the security with which peasants may live on and work the land.

Concentration of Rural Land Ownership: The degree of concentration of land ownership is an index of the grip of the latifundia system on a region and hence of the degree of dependency of the peasantry upon the landed elite. The landowner, as one who controls the land, controls the benefits which flow from it--chiefly those of a secure income and social status, with such attendant advantages as access to credit and political influence. Also, land-ownership may confer the employer role. When most of the land is owned by a relative few, the bulk of the peasant population is highly dependent upon landlords for access to the means of subsistence--employment or land--unless they can discover alternate means of earning income or can organize themselves against the owners. By the same token, where land is more equally distributed

5. Ibid. These figures may be an overestimate as claimed by Schultz, Population Growth and Internal Migration in Colombia.

TABLE 1

COLOMBIA: RURAL POPULATION GROWTH
RATES BY DEPARTMENT, 1951-1964

Geo-Political Unit	Average Yearly Growth Rate of Rural Population 1951-1964 (Percent)	Percent Change in Total Rural Population 1951-1964
COLOMBIA		
Total	1.32	18.59
Departments	1.25	17.53
COASTAL DEPARTMENTS		
Magdalena	4.45	79.31
Cordoba	3.93	65.01
Bolivar	2.40	36.08
Atlantico	1.73	24.99
OTHER DEPARTMENTS		
Meta	5.75	106.38
Cauca	1.93	28.74
Choco	1.74	25.54
Antioquia	1.61	23.04
Boyaca	1.37	19.42
Nariño	1.32	18.59
Huila	1.29	18.18
Norte Santander	.87	12.56
Santander	.81	11.14
Cundinamarca	.80	10.94
Caldas	(-) .04	(-) .50
Tolima	(-) .43	(-) 5.44
Valle del Cauca	(-) .62	(-) 7.76
(Other Departments excluding Caldas, Valle, and Tolima)	1.30	18.34

Source: Derived from DANE, XIII Censo Nacional de Población, 15 de julio de 1964: Resumen General (Bogotá, 1967), Cuadro 4, p. 31.

the number of potential employers increases, as do the alternatives of the peasantry who are less dependent upon a few sources of employment and hence enjoy a better bargaining position since employers have to compete with one another to supply their labor needs.

The concentration of landholdings has additional important implications for the adoption of new technologies and innovations. It has long been noted

TABLE 2

COLOMBIA: RURAL POPULATION DENSITIES, 1938, 1951, and 1964

Political Unit	1938		1951		1964	
	Rural Persons Per Square Kilometer	Rank Order	Rural Persons Per Square Kilometer	Rank Order	Rural Persons Per Square Kilometer	Rank Order
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
COLOMBIA						
Total	5.28		6.22		7.37	
Departments	9.94		11.69		13.74	
COASTAL						
DEPARTMENTS	6.31		8.06		12.54	
Atlantico	11.6	8.5	15.9	6	19.9	5
Cordoba ^a	7.8	12	9.8	13	16.1	8
Bolivar	7.7	13	9.5	14	12.9	12
Magdalena	4.0	15	5.5	15	9.8	15
(Coastal Departments Excluding Magdalena)	7.9		9.9		14.5	
OTHER						
DEPARTMENTS	10.78		12.54		14.02	
Caldas	40.5	1	50.6	1	50.4	1
Cundinamarca	28.4	2	30.0	2	33.3	2
Valle	17.0	4	26.2	3	24.2	3
Tolima	18.1	3	22.1	4	20.9	4
Antioquia	13.2	6	14.9	7	18.4	6
Santander	15.2	5	16.3	5	18.1	7
Nariño	11.6	8.5	13.4	8	15.8	8
Cauca	9.9	10	11.9	9	15.3	10
Norte Santander	11.8	7	11.6	10	13.0	11
Boyaca	9.5	11	9.9	12	11.9	13
Huila	7.6	14	10.2	11	11.9	14
Choco	2.0	16	2.4	16	2.9	16
Meta ^o	.4	17	.5	17	1.0	17
(Other Departments Excluding Meta)	13.0		15.2		16.9	

^aIn 1951 Cordoba was created from the western municipios of the department of Bolivar; the 1938 figures are for those municipios.

(continued)

(Table 2 continued)

^bMeta was elevated from an intendencia (territory) to departmental status in 1959; the earlier figures refer to the same geographic area.

Source: DANE, XIII Censo Nacional de Población, 15 de julio de 1964: Resumen General (Bogotá, 1967), pp. 30-31.

that innovations are generally adopted first by the better-off persons.⁶ While latifundistas may not generally be thought of as innovative persons, they do control the resources and have the access to other inputs (e.g., capital) necessary for the adoption of new technologies. Hence as the distribution of wealth is highly correlated with the distribution of the land, so too are the benefits from the adoption of new technologies, or from any form of economic enterprise, likely to be distributed in accord with the distribution of the land. In sum, the rich get richer as "wealth and innovativeness go hand in hand."⁷

If agricultural land is fairly equally distributed, the existing farm units might have a greater ability to absorb a growing rural population as well as to share more equally in the benefits of new technologies, etc.⁸ However, if the land ownership patterns are more highly skewed, with huge latifundias utilizing most of the land in a very extensive manner and therefore not employing much labor, or if the owners of these latifundias find it expedient to discharge their labor forces, then one of the only alternatives for the growing numbers of rural poor seems to be invasion of these latifundia lands.

Nevertheless, while much of Latin America is characterized by highly skewed distribution of rural landholdings,⁹ not all countries have experienced peasant uprisings. And even in those which have experienced such uprisings, the peasantry did not rise up en masse, but began instead in fairly localized settings. Therefore, the crux of this issue of the relationship of land distribution and peasant movements may well lie within the intra-country differences in the degree of concentration of landownership: rural unrest and land invasions are more likely to occur in areas in which ownership of the land is most highly concentrated.

6. E. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

7. E. Rogers and F. Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A Cross Cultural Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 187. Also see D. Stanfield and G. Whiting, "Economic Strata and Opportunity Structure as Determinants of Innovativeness and Productivity in Rural Brazil," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society Convention, August 1970.

8. See W. F. Owen, "The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agriculture," The American Economic Review 66 (March 1966): 61-65.

9. S. L. Barraclough and A. L. Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries," Land Economics 43 (November 1966): 392-424.

TABLE 3

COLOMBIA: AGRICULTURAL LAND-MAN RATIOS, CHANGES THEREIN
AND AGRICULTURAL LAND AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE AREA OF THE
GEO-POLITICAL UNITS

Geo-Political Unit	Hectares of Farm Land Per Rural Person		Percent Change in Hectares of Farm Land Per Rural Person	Hectares of Arable Land Per Rural Person	Hectares of Arable Land Plus Permanent Crop Land Per Rural Person	Percent of Geographic Area in Farms
	1951-54 ^a	1960-64 ^b	1950-54 to 1960-64	1960-64	1960-64	1960
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
COLOMBIA						
Total	4.02					24.00
Departments	3.95	3.43	-13.16	.44	.62	50.31
COASTAL DEPARTMENTS	11.44	4.96	-56.64	.50	.58	62.22
Atlantico	6.5	4.3	-34.5	.50	.54	84.60
Bolivar	8.5	3.8	-54.8	.37	.43	49.43
Cordoba	9.2	4.0	-54.5	.39	.44	64.42
Magdalena	18.7	7.1	-62.1	.74	.88	69.58
(Coastal Departments Excluding Magdalena)	(8.6)	(3.9)	(-54.14)	(.388)	(.437)	
OTHER DEPARTMENTS ^b	2.79	3.56	+27.59	.421	.630	47.22
Antioquia	3.6	2.4	-33.3			43.89
Caldas	1.8	1.7	- 5.6			84.41
Cauca	3.8	2.2	-42.1			31.40
Cundinamarca	2.3	1.9	-17.4			63.65
Huila	7.2	4.2	-41.7			49.91
Nariño	2.6	1.4	-46.2			22.31
Norte Santander	3.5	3.1	-11.4			40.06
Santander	2.5	3.3	+32.0			59.13
Tolima	3.2	3.4	+ 6.3			70.09

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Valle del Cauca	2.4	2.3	- 4.2			54.91
Boyaca ^c	1.6	4.7	+193.8			56.14
Meta ^d		35.4				36.23
OTHER DEPARTMENTS						
Excluding Meta		2.91				
Excluding Boyaca	2.95					
Excluding Meta and Boyaca		2.72	- 7.79			55.56

^aNeither the department of Choco or Meta are included. An agricultural census has never been taken in Choco, and Meta was not a department at this time. Consequently, their 1951 rural populations have been removed from these figures.

^bDoes not include area of Choco.

^cBoyaca figures from 1954 do not include the llanos region Casanare, while the population figures are from 1951 and do include persons living in the Casanare.

^dBecame a department in 1959.

Sources: Column 1: Land Area 1954 from DANE Muestra Agrícola Nacional 1955 (Bogotá, 1955), p. 49; and Misión Económica y Humanismo, Presidencia de la República, Comité Nacional de Planeación, Dirección Ejecutivo (Bogotá D.E.), octubre de 1958, p. 126.

Columns 2, 4, and 5: from DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario) 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 25.

Population Data and Geographic Areas from DANE, XIII Censo Nacional de Población, 15 de julio de 1964: Resumen General (Bogotá, 1967), pp. 30-31.

In Colombia this is precisely the case. Colombia's overall (Gini) index of concentration of rural landownership is .862 as indicated in column (2) of Table 4, which reflects the fact that fewer than 2 percent of the farm units control over 55 percent of the agricultural land.¹⁰ Such figures overstate the general degree of concentration of land holdings in Colombia, however, because they include data from the departments of Meta and Boyaca, both of which have vast expanses of land in the eastern llanos (rolling plains between mountains and amazonic forests). In these llanos areas latifundia is the predominant form of land tenure; they account for over 55 percent of all of Colombia's farms greater than 2,500 hectares in size, and for over 71 percent of the land area in such farms. Consequently, Meta and Boyaca have the highest land concentration ratios, as measured by the Gini index, of any departments in Colombia--.93 and .91, respectively. When these are removed, the resulting ratio of the concentration of land holdings for Colombia drops to .836--less than the same ratio for any one of the coastal departments which were the locus of peasant land invasions in the 1960s.

The percentage of land controlled by the largest farms can also be utilized to gain an insight into the degree of concentration of land holdings or the skewedness of land distribution. (For the purposes of this study, a farm of 100 hectares or more will be considered as "large.") Although farms of 100 or more hectares comprise only 3.56 percent of the number of farms in Colombia (see Table 4), they control over 65 percent of all the agricultural land. When the farms of Boyaca and Meta are excluded, the percentage of national land in such large units drops to 59.89 percent. In the coastal departments, however, over 75 percent of all the agricultural land is controlled by the large farms. This is nearly twice the proportion controlled by the latifundias in the other departments when Boyaca and Meta are excluded (42 percent). Even in the smallest and most densely populated department in Colombia, that of Atlantico, where large farms control the lowest proportion of land of any of the coastal departments, nearly two-thirds of the farm land is in these large units--which is a greater portion than found in any other department except for Valle del Cauca and, of course, Boyaca and Meta.

In sum, as shown by Table 4, there is a very close relationship between the measures of the degree of concentration of control over the land and the percentage of the land controlled by farm units of 100 hectares or more. Moreover, the mean and modal farm sizes shown in Table 4, which more meaningfully depict the land holdings of the vast majority of campesinos, were notably smaller in the coastal departments than in the interior. All these measures support the hypothesis that peasant unrest tends to occur in areas of greater inequality of the distribution of agricultural land. So the coastal departments were frequently the scene of rural land invasions in the 1960s.

Relative Security of Tenure: While it is true that a smaller farm area available to absorb a rapidly growing population produces the man-land pressure

10. Colombia's Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) calculated the "coefficient of concentration of land tenure" based on the 1960 Agrarian Census to be .864. See DANE, Boletín Mensual de Estadística, no. 222 (Bogotá, enero de 1970), back cover.

which led to rural land invasions in the coastal departments, the usufructuary security of the land occupant is also very important. I will argue here that the bulk of the coastal peasantry had very tenuous and insecure relationships to the land and that the interjection of new political and economic factors upset the traditional order,¹¹ giving rise to the displacement of numerous peasants and consequently also to the rural unrest manifested in the form of peasant land invasions.

The relation of the security of tenure to the degree of rural unrest can be stated as follows: rural land invasions tend to occur where there is a low proportion of owner-operated titled farms (the most secure form of tenure). The evidence in Table 5 supports this hypothesis. It shows that a lower percentage of the total amount of agricultural units in the coastal region are owner-operated titled farms, and that these are the largest units. The smallest units in the coastal area have lower rates of owner-occupancy and control less than 1 percent of the total land in the area. Small farms in the interior areas have much higher rates of owner-occupancy and control roughly 5 percent of the available land.

It follows, then, that a sizeable number of farms in the coastal area are worked by tenants. Table 6 shows that by far the greatest number of these rent very small units. In fact, the region's smallest rented farms account for a larger portion of the total area in that size category (39.2 percent) than do the owner-operated farms (36.1 percent). Obviously, the preconditions for tensions between rural landlords and their tenants on small-sized plots were more prevalent in the coastal regions than elsewhere in Colombia.

Within the institution of tenancy, the degree of security to the land enjoyed by the tenant depends to a large extent upon two inter-related factors -- the size of the rented unit, and the contractual arrangements he has with the landowner. The size of the rented unit is important because rented units of larger than 15 hectares are exempted from agrarian reform statutes. Size is also important because, as shown in Table 7, there is a direct relationship in Colombia between the size of the rented unit, the form of the tenancy agreement, and the region in which the rented unit is located. It is posited here that the usufructuary security enjoyed by the tenant is a direct function of both the above variables: the larger the rented unit the more likely the tenant is to be economically better off, which, in turn, implies an accompanying socio-political status and awareness of his contractual rights. Also, on larger rented units it is more likely that the agreement with the landlord will be of a modern type, specifying the rights and obligations of both parties and hence less likely that the tenant will be a *costeño campesino*.

Of the four forms of tenancy agreements listed in Table 7, the fixed-payment agreement is the most modern and secure. Table 8 shows that a lower proportion of the number and area of rented farms in the coastal area are under this form

11. Three major factors can be identified in Colombia: the post-World War II surge of agricultural mechanization; a chronic inflation which has made the holding of land as an inflationary hedge a worthy end in itself; the agrarian reform law of 1961 which provides for expropriation of large holdings for distribution among former tenants and which has caused large numbers of illegal expulsions of tenants.

TABLE 4

COLOMBIA: THE CONCENTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION
OF AGRICULTURAL LAND HOLDINGS, 1960

Geo-Political Unit	Gini Index of the Concentration of land ownership ^a	Percent of Agricultural Land in Farms of 100 or more Hectares	Mean Average Farm Size in Hectares	Median Average Farm Size in Hectares ^b	Modal Average Farm Size in Hectares ^c	Second Most Frequent Average Farm Size in Hectares ^c
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
COLOMBIA ^d	.862	65.00	22.6	2.4	1.4	6.9
Colombia excluding Meta and Boyaca	.836	59.89	19.9	3.3	1.4	6.9
COASTAL DEPARTMENTS	.868	75.25	38.8	2.19	.18	1.23
Bolivar	.87	70.4	28.6	2.2	.2	1.3
Magdalena	.87	81.8	59.0	3.2	.2	1.2
Cordoba	.85	69.4	33.5	2.2	.2	1.3
Atlantico	.85	64.6	23.2	2.1	1.1	.56
OTHER DEPARTMENTS	.853	62.69	19.76	3.37	1.4	6.9
Nariño	.70	23.8	7.7	2.3	1.3	6.8
Norte de Santander	.72	44.7	21.3	6.9	6.9	13.7
Cauca	.78	45.5	13.0	3.4	1.5	6.9
Santander	.79	54.5	20.3	4.2	6.8	13.5
Caldas	.79	47.1	13.6	3.5	7.4	1.5
Cundinamarca	.79	43.4	10.5	2.5	1.6	6.9
Huila	.80	60.5	28.7	4.2	6.7	13.4
Valle del Cauca	.81	65.6	23.0	4.5	6.6	1.6
Tolima	.82	60.1	22.6	4.1	6.7	1.2
Antioquia	.86	59.4	13.3	1.5	.2	.7
Boyaca	.91	76.4	22.2	1.5	1.5	.8
Meta	.93	93.6	196.3	6.6	7.1	13.3
Other Departments excluding Meta and Boyaca	.810	42.86	15.96	3.36	1.4	6.9

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

^aThe Gini indices of the degree of concentration of land ownership were computed by the Academic Computing Center, University of Wisconsin, using the FOR/SI/GCR Program, which employed the computational formula of:

$$R = 1 - \frac{f_i (q_i - 1 + q_i)}{10,000}$$

where:

R = Gini index of concentration or inequality

f_i = Percentage frequency of occurrence in each size category

q_i = The cumulative percentage by each size category

^aFor discussion of this methodology of measuring inequalities see C. Gini, "On Measurement of Concentration with Special Reference to Income and Wealth," abstract of papers presented at the Cowles Commission Research Conference on Economics and Statistics (Colorado College Publication, 1936). Also see Singer, E. M., Antitrust Economics: Selected Legal Cases and Economic Models (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1968), Chapter 13; and "Distributional Issues: Trends and Policies," in Papers and Proceedings, the American Economic Review, December 29-30, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 2 (May, 1970), pp. 247-299.

^bBecause the census data are published by size categories, the median average farm sizes were calculated by dividing the area of farms in the median size category by the number of farms in that size category. The cumulative percentage of the number of farms up to and including the median size categories were: Colombia, 50.13; Colombia excluding Boyaca and Meta, 56.2; Coastal Departments, 50.7; Bolivar, 52.8; Magdalena, 51.1; Cordoba, 51.1; Atlantico, 58.6; Other Departments, 58.0; Nariño, 51.2; Norte de Santander, 59.5; Cauca, 57.2; Santander, 59.5; Caldas, 57.4; Cundinamarca, 56.2, Huila, 47.0; Valle del Cauca, 52.2; Tolima, 51.9; Antioquia, 53.4; Boyaca, 49.4; Meta, 53.1; Other Departments excluding Boyaca and Meta, 56.3.

^cThe modal average farm sizes and second most frequent average farm sizes were also calculated on a similar basis as the median average farm sizes; the respective size category areas were divided by the number of farms in the categories. Consequently, the farm sizes in Columns 5, 6, and 7 are not the precise median and modal figures, but, as stated, are the mean averages of the respective size categories.

^dFor Meta and Boyaca, fewer than 50 percent of the farms were used as the median because by employing the next farm size category the percentages would have to increase to over 62 percent for Huila and over 60 percent for Boyaca.

Sources: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario) 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 39, and 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses. Data for Valle del Cauca was calculated from the summation of all the published departmental censuses subtracted from national totals.

TABLE 5

COLOMBIA: OWNER-OPERATED TITLED FARMS, BY
SIZE CATEGORY AND BY REGION, 1960

Farm Size Category (Hectares)	Number as Percent of Total Number of Farms in Size Category	Area as Percent of Total Farm Area in Size Category	Percent of Total Number of Owner Operated Titled Farms	Percent of Total Area In Owner Operated Titled Farms
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coastal Departments				
0 5	48.58	36.13	48.31	.81
5 30	68.50	73.41	23.74	5.63
30 100	80.97	81.53	15.97	14.97
100 or more	99.21	91.38	11.98	78.59
Total Farms	(59.74)	(87.51)	100.00	100.00
Other Departments				
0 5	60.66	61.15	60.84	4.92
5 30	61.50	67.23	29.62	16.28
30 100	68.57	69.84	6.52	15.91
100 or more	68.91	67.22	3.02	62.89
Total Farms	(62.91)	(67.16)	100.00	100.00

Source: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 42; and the 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for Atlantico (p. 14), Bolivar (p. 16), Cordoba (p. 16), and Magdalena (p. 16) (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

of tenancy, and that most of the farms so rented are the larger, reform-exempt ones. The coastal departments also lag badly behind in this form of tenancy on the smallest units.¹²

Sharecropping is by far the most prevalent form of tenancy in Colombia. Over 51 percent of all the farms rented and 47 percent of all the rented area are under sharecropping agreements in which both the owner and renter

12. Some of these may be village lots (solares) or non-urban rented residential and vacation retreats (quintas).

TABLE 6

COLOMBIA: AGRICULTURAL TENANCY, BY SIZE CATEGORY,
AND BY REGION, 1960

Size of Farm Category (Hectares) (1)	Rented Farms as a Percent of the Total Number of Farms in Size Category (2)	Area in Rented Farms as a Percent of Total Farm Area in Size Category (3)	Percent of Total Number of Rented Farms (4)	Percent of Total Area in Rented Farms (5)
Coastal Departments				
0 5	33.8	39.2	87.5	29.4
5 30	11.8	8.4	10.6	21.3
30 100	2.4	2.3	1.3	14.1
100 or more	1.7	1.2	.6	35.2
TOTAL	22.9	2.6	100.0	100.0
Other Departments				
0 5	28.0	24.3	75.5	15.2
5 30	17.5	17.0	21.1	30.8
30 100	10.2	10.6	2.6	18.1
100 or more	7.1	5.1	.8	35.9
TOTAL	23.4	8.96	100.0	100.0

Source: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 43; and the 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for Atlántico (p. 15), Bolívar (p. 17), Córdoba (p. 17), and Magdalena (p. 17) (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

share in the economic risks and payoffs of the enterprise.¹³ This form of tenancy is of greater predominance among the smaller rented farms as compared

13. While sharecropping agreements can take many contractual forms, the most common involves the landlord supplying only the land and the tenant supplying the inputs, with the product being equally divided. However, sometimes the land owner will also supply all of the inputs except the labor, deduct these costs and then divide the remaining output on a 50-50 basis. These latter forms of sharecropping are commonly referred to as compañía, (company) and are often found in the cooler climates of the mountain region.

TABLE 7

COLOMBIA: TENANCY AGREEMENTS, BY SIZE OF AGRICULTURAL UNIT, BY REGION, 1960

Tenancy Agreement	Mean Average Size of Unit in Hectares		
	Colombia	Coastal Departments	Other Departments
<u>Fixed Payment</u> - either cash, species, or a combination of both received by owner from tenant for use of the land. Tenant assumes entire production risk, and supplies all inputs except the land.	11.3	7.3	11.9
<u>Sharecropping</u> - tenant and landlord may share in inputs and share the product, or income produced. Both tenant and owner share economic risk involved.	6.6	4.9	6.7
<u>Labor Exchange</u> - tenant receives usufructuary rights to a plot of land in exchange for working for the landlord an agreed upon number of days per time period. Product from plot is entirely for the tenant worker.	3.1	2.9	3.1
<u>Other</u> - farms held in trust or in process of probate, etc.	6.2	3.9	7.6

Source: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 23 (page 14 for definitions).

to the fixed-payment tenancy. Among the rented farms of between 5 and 30 hectares, sharecropping tenancy is most common; national figures show 66.75 percent of the rented farms and 69.6 percent of the rented area in this size category being sharecropped.¹⁴

In the coastal region, however, only 14 percent of all the rented farms and only 16 percent of all rented area is under such agreements. Even

¹⁴. DANE, XII Censo Nacional de Población.

TABLE 8

COLOMBIA: FARM AND AREAS IN FIXED PAYMENT
TENANCY, BY SIZE CATEGORY, AND BY REGION, 1960

Size Category (Hectares)	Number of Farms Rented for Fixed Payment as Percent of Total Number of Farms Rented in Category	Area in Farms Rented for Fixed Payment as Percent of Total Area Rented in Size Category	Number in Size Category as a Percent of Total Number of Farms Rented for Fixed Payment	Area in Size Category as a Percent of Total Area of Farms Rented for Fixed Payment	Mean Average Size of Farms Rented for Fixed Payment (Hectares)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Coastal Departments					
0 5	16.1	11.3	89.1	12.5	1.0
5 30	11.0	12.6	7.2	10.0	10.2
30 100	28.5	30.8	2.2	16.2	54.1
100 or more	41.8	46.5	1.5	61.3	286.5
TOTAL	16.31	26.7	100.0	100.0	7.3
Other Departments					
0 5	19.2	16.6	75.9	8.4	1.3
5 30	16.5	16.1	18.2	16.4	10.8
30 100	29.3	30.5	4.0	18.4	54.8
100 or more	41.0	47.6	1.9	56.8	380.8
TOTAL	19.06	30.09	100.0	100.0	11.9

Source: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 43; and 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for Atlantico (p. 15), Bolivar (p. 17), Cordoba (p. 17), and Magdalena (p. 17) (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

in the 5-to-30 hectare size category only 26 percent of the number and area of the rented coastal farms is sharecropped. In short, contrary to what might be expected, the coastal region has considerably lower percentages of its rented units under the sharecropping form of tenancy.

The reasons why sharecropping is of relatively little importance in the coastal departments are found in: the productive patterns of the crops most commonly produced on these farms, and the nature of the market in which such crops are sold. Under sharecropping tenancy, the income received by both the landlord and tenant is directly proportional to the levels of production achieved, and to the prices received for the product. Consequently, this form of tenancy is quite suited for farms on which the production levels and price levels are subject to wide variations. The greater are such variations the less willing would tenants be to accept -- or landlords able to impose -- fixed rental contracts, since income levels would be indeterminate until the crop is harvested and sold. In Colombia two crops are distinguished by fluctuating levels of production and prices -- tobacco and coffee. The latter crop is of little importance in the coastal departments. Tobacco does grow there, and under sharecropping arrangements, but not in sufficient amounts to lift the percentage of units farmed under this type of arrangement above a top of 23 percent (in Cordoba).

The third form of tenancy, labor-exchange, is of relatively minor importance: nationally, it accounts for only 8.23 percent of the number of tenancy agreements.¹⁵ In exchange for a small plot of land (on which he can only make permanent improvements -- fruit or coffee trees, fences, etc. -- with the express permission of the landlord), the tenant agrees to work a specified number of days for the landowner. Cash wages are rare. These are the smallest farms (87 percent are less than 1.2 hectares in area) cultivated by farmers receiving the least in cash wages.¹⁶

Table 9 demonstrates that in general the coastal departments have a much higher proportion -- 14 percent of all rented farms -- under labor-exchange tenancy than most other departments of Colombia. As a proportion of the total area rented in the coast, nearly 9 percent is under labor-exchange-tenancy, compared to only 3 percent in the rest of the country. The importance of these agreements to the smaller rented farms throughout Colombia is shown by the perfect inverse relationship found in both columns (2) and (3): as the size of the rented unit increases, labor exchange tenancy decreases. The figures of columns (4) and (5) show that in the coastal region -- contrary to what was found in the other forms of tenancy -- the largest portion of the total area so rented is also found in the smallest size category, rather than among units of a larger size as might be predicted by the greater skewness of land distribution in the Caribbean region.

The three forms of tenancy thus far described and analyzed are commonly found -- with local variations -- throughout Latin America. When these three

15. DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario) 1960: Resumen Nacional, vol. 1 (Bototá, diciembre de 1962), p. 43.

16. Ibid.

TABLE 9

COLOMBIA: FARMS AND AREA IN LABOR EXCHANGE
TENANCY, BY SIZE CATEGORY AND BY REGION, 1960

Size Category (Hectares)	Number of Farms Rented for Labor Exchange Tenancy as a Percent of Total Number of Rented Farms in Size Category	Area of Farms Rented for Labor Exchange Tenancy as a Percent of Total Rented Area in Size Category	Number in Size Category as a Percent of Total Number of Farms Rented by Labor Exchange Tenancy	Area in Size Category as Percent of Total Area Rented by Labor Exchange Tenancy	Mean Average Size of Farms Rented Under Labor Exchange Tenancy
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
-----Coastal Departments-----					
0 5	14.1	13.4	91.0	44.3	1.4
5 30	9.9	9.9	7.8	23.6	8.9
30 100	9.5	8.7	.9	13.8	45.9
100 or more	6.4	4.6	.3	18.3	187.7
TOTAL FARMS	13.5	8.9	100.0	100.0	2.9
-----Other Departments-----					
0 5	8.4	6.6	86.9	33.3	1.2
5 30	4.1	3.5	11.8	35.2	9.3
30 100	2.9	2.5	1.1	15.3	44.9
100 or more	2.2	1.4	.2	16.2	208.7
TOTAL FARMS	7.3	3.0	100.0	100.0	3.1

Sources: DANE, Directoría Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias Censo Agropecuario 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 43, and the 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for Atlántico (p. 15), Bolívar (p. 17), Córdoba (p. 17), and Magdalena (p. 17), (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

forms of tenancy are examined in perspective, it is seen that they account for approximately 80 percent of all the rented units and area in Colombia as a whole. Yet within the coastal departments, less than one-half of the rented farms can be accounted for by these three forms of tenancy. (See Table 10.)

TABLE 10
COLOMBIA: PROPORTION OF TENANCY
CATEGORIES BY REGION, 1960

Form of Tenancy	-----Rented Farms-----					
	<u>Colombia Total</u>		<u>Coastal Departments</u>		<u>Other Departments</u>	
	Percent of Number	Percent of Area	Percent of Number	Percent of Area	Percent of Number	Percent of Area
Fixed Payment	18.7	29.8	16.3	26.7	19.1	30.1
Sharecropping	51.4	47.8	14.8	16.5	57.6	51.0
Labor Exchange	8.2	3.6	13.5	8.9	7.3	3.0
TOTALS	78.3	81.2	44.6	52.1	84.0	84.1

Source: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 43, and Tables 8, 9 infor.

The tenants under the fourth, "other form of renting" -- haciendo roza, are generally identified by the title of "colonist" (colono).¹⁷ The distinctive characteristic of these colonists is that their plots of land are

17. The usage of the term "colonist" to describe this type of tenant is the source of the methodological confusion in categorizing these units in the census data and in other studies which have attempted to delve into Colombian tenancy situations. For example, the C.I.D.A. study of Colombia's agrarian sector--Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-Económico del Sector Agrícola -- Colombia (Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola, published by Pan American Union, OAS, Washington, D.C., 1966)--appears to be somewhat confused as to the proper category for such persons, as it describes this form of tenancy under two different headings. It rightly qualifies its discussion of the colonization of public lands to describe this form of tenancy on private lands as being in the "other forms of tenancy" category (p. 128). Two pages later, however, it declares that this tenancy relationship occurs under the category of labor-exchange tenancy, which it then claims to be characterized by "floating or migratory workers" (obrerros flotantes).

The C.I.D.A. study (and that of A. Quimbaya, El Problema de la Tierra en Colombia [Bogotá: Ediciones Suramericana, 1967]), which also placed such persons under several headings) as well as this study, are based upon data taken from the 1960 agrarian census. What is relied upon, then, is the methodological

located on private lands, or at least on lands which are knowingly claimed to be within the domain of latifundia owners. Under this form of tenancy, the colono-tenant receives permission from an owner to work a fixed amount of land which is in a "non-civilized state" (i.e., covered with brush and trees which make it unsuitable for either cultivation or pasture) for a fixed number of years (usually 1-3). During that time the tenant must clear the land of its brush and woods and is permitted to grow a few annual crops for his subsistence. In exchange for these usufructuary rights the colono-tenant agrees to plant seeds of pasture grasses (which may be furnished by the owner) and to vacate the land after the time period has ended.

Historically, this has been the method by which the large latifundias of the coast create pasture lands for their cattle herds.¹⁸ It has created one of the principal arenas of rural strife and conflict in the coastal departments. The colono-tenant, after clearing the plot of land, would like to prolong his stay in order to cultivate and harvest his subsistence crops without repeating the backbreaking task of felling and clearing away the trees and brush. The owner, on the other hand, desires the cleared and seeded pasture lands as quickly as possible for his cattle. Rather than permit the colono-tenant to continue to hack away at the brush and woods "pushing back the frontier" and leaving pasture lands behind in a treadmill-like fashion, the owner requires that the colono-tenant move to a new, completely wooded plot. This is done because owners claim that the tenant would spend too much time tending his crops and too little time pushing back the woods. Consequently disputes often arise as to the proper time for the colono to move on and clear a new plot of brushland: should he be allowed another month for his corn crop to ripen; is he also going to try to plant a quick crop of beans so that his departure will be even longer delayed? The colono-tenant has very tenuous usufructuary rights indeed.

Often to hasten the process of departure, the landowner simply drives his cattle onto the plot to graze and feed not only upon the new pasture lands, but also upon the colono's rice, corn, beans, etc. In this process, the

17. (cont'd) rigor of the census takers. In some cases, as young high school and college students were the census takers, one may question how they categorized a colono-tenant who probably identified himself only as being a "colono." In all probability, persons of this type were classified under all three census categories: colonization, labor-exchange tenancy, as well as "other forms of tenancy." The figures do suggest, however, that probably most of these colono-tenants were included in the latter.

18. See C.I.D.A., Colombia, pp. 125-32; Quimbaya, El Problema de la Tierra en Colombia, p. 4; G. De Roux, "Die Ungeplante Siedlung in Kolumbia" ("Spontaneous Colonization in Colombia"), Unpublished Paper (Berlin: Institute of Foreign Agriculture, Technical University of Berlin, 1966), p. 12; and I.L.O., Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Colombia (Geneva: Interamerican Labour Office, 1970), p. 165. Taylor also reports similar tenancy agreements in Nicaragua; see J. Taylor, "Agricultural Settlement and Development in Eastern Nicaragua," Land Tenure Center Research Paper no. 33 (Madison, Wisconsin: Land Tenure Center, 1969).

rustic hut of the colonist is also generally destroyed, along with whatever personal belongings he was foolish enough to leave unguarded.¹⁹

Besides such a "push factor" to move along, a benevolent landlord may also offer a slight "pull factor" to entice the colono to a new plot in the form of a small cash wage so subsistence needs can be purchased until sufficient lands are cleared to grow and harvest a few crops.²⁰

While not all of the rented farms in this "other forms of tenancy" category are of colono-tenants, Table 11 clearly shows that these "others" were the predominant form of tenancy in the coastal region of Colombia as of 1960. Over 55 percent of the rented units and nearly 48 percent of the rented area in the coastal departments were in this category of "other forms of tenancy," as compared to only 16 percent of the rented units and area in the remaining departments. Among the smallest coastal farms the proportions are of even greater magnitude (88 percent of the units so rented). In the coastal area, the proportion of this form of tenancy decreases as rented farms increase in size; elsewhere in the country, after an initial drop from the smallest size category, the reverse is true.

In summary, as of 1960, the colono-tenant form of tenancy was by far the most prevalent form of renting in the coastal departments. As the most completely dependent upon the good will of the latifundistas for usufructuary privileges to the land, this form of tenancy has habitually been characterized by conflict -- though admittedly much was held in abeyance due to the lack of alternatives perceived by the colono-tenants. However, in more recent years, much of even the poor alternative -- more wooded lands to "civilize" -- has been withdrawn from the colono-tenant as cotton has boomed in the region and brought with it bulldozers to clear the land more rapidly. Thus, pressures and unrest increased as the major form of coastal tenancy, which gave the colono-tenant only very tenuous and temporary usufructuary security at best, has been and is being largely replaced by mechanization. Further evidence is thus brought to bear on the fact that rural land invasions do tend to occur where tenants have less security of usufructuary rights.

19. The study of Colombia by C.I.D.A., however, also takes note of the coastal custom of the people to live together in villages and go out to work the land on a daily basis. While this is true, in more recent years, as a greater proportion of the land surrounding the villages has been cleared, the colono-tenant now often finds it necessary to live on the roza due to the increased distance between it and the village. Many take their entire families with them as they clear lands further and further away from the small villages. Or, alternatively, the colono may construct a small hut on the parcel in which he lives for several days of the week while clearing the land and cultivating his subsistence crops, while his family remains in the village. Landlords, however, try to discourage such arrangements claiming that their colonos "spend too much time in the village and not enough time clearing the land," which, of course, is the primary interest of the owner.

20. In more recent years these colono-tenants of the coast are finding it increasingly difficult to locate employment of this type because of the boom in cotton growing in the coastal departments (see below, pp. 28-30).

TABLE 11

COLOMBIA: FARMS AND AREA RENTED IN OTHER
FORMS OF TENANCY, BY SIZE AND REGION, 1960

Size Category (Hectares)	Number of Farms Rented by Other Forms of Tenancy as Percent of Total Rented in Size Category	Area of Farms Rented by Other Forms of Tenancy as Percent of Total Area Rented in Size Category	Number in Size Category as Percent of Total Area Rented by "Other Forms of Tenancy"	Area in Size Category as Percent of Total Area Rented by "Other Forms of Tenancy"	Mean Average Size of Farms Rented Under "Other Forms of Tenancy"
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
-----Coastal Departments-----					
0 5	56.0	57.0	88.5	35.0	1.5
5 30	52.4	51.0	10.1	22.7	8.7
30 100	43.4	43.0	.9	12.7	49.6
100 or more	42.2	40.3	.5	29.6	245.4
TOTAL FARMS	55.4	47.8	100.00	100.0	3.9
-----Other Departments-----					
0 5	17.9	12.6	84.8	11.9	1.06
5 30	9.2	8.5	12.1	16.4	10.2
30 100	13.7	13.0	2.2	14.8	50.3
100 or more	17.4	25.2	.9	56.9	447.0
TOTAL FARMS	16.0	15.9	100.0	100.0	7.6

Sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960, Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 43, and the 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for the departments of Atlántico (p. 15), Bolívar (p. 17), Córdoba (p. 17), Magdalena (p. 17) (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

A Summary of Renting: In the coastal departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Cordoba, and Magdalena (which today also includes the coastal departments of Sucre and Cesar) tenancy was found to be much more prevalent among the smaller farms than in the interior of Colombia. Nearly twice the proportion of the total farm area of these small units was rented in those four departments, principally under conditions which offer the tenant the least degree of usufructuary security to the land -- those of the colono-tenancy and of the labor-exchange tenancy agreements. Consequently, the potential preconditions for rural unrest existed, since coastal tenants did not have many rights to the land. The early 1960s saw two factors combine to take advantage of their precarious tenancy rights and result in the hesitancy of landlords to renew rental contracts, if not the outright dismissal of tenants: the passage of agrarian reform legislation which contained the goal of converting tenants into owners; and the increased use of mechanization in land clearing for cotton (and rice) farming as well as for pastures. Thus the latent conditions for rural unrest became overt, and the coastal region was by far the most frequent scene of rural land invasions in the mid to late 1960s.

Although the agrarian reform law of 1961 and its enabling legislation contained specific provisions for granting greater security to tenants, legal requirements and processes prescribed in modern capital cities are often of dubious applicability in the coastal hinterlands. Among the types of "proofs of tenancy" accepted by INCORA to enroll a tenant in this program of agrarian reform are the following legal documents:

1. Written contracts of the rental agreement;
2. Receipts of rental payments;
3. Written recognition of the tenants and their rights by the owner;
4. Copies of two court summons served upon the owner;
5. Original copy of expulsion order written by the owner;
6. Certificate from the banks that the owner had co-signed loans for the tenant.

In a rural society where campesinos characteristically have less than two years of education and patron-client relationships are based upon personal familiarity, few campesino tenants can fulfill such requisites. Large-scale renters -- who generally have fixed payment contracts with the landowners -- are the most likely to engage in legal paperwork. Contracts are usually verbal agreements, and payments are made in the form of labor or work to the nearly all-powerful land owners, who are hardly likely to give written certificates recognizing the tenants' rights to the land. Poor, illiterate tenants, ignorant of their rights, do not have court summonses served upon their patrons who, in turn, do not give legal written dismissal notices to their tenants when hired administrators (and armed guards, if necessary) serve equally well, if not better, and more expediently.

To be sure, some colono-tenants, beguiled by young lawyers from the reform agency, do try to take legal action to regain plots of land from which they have been expelled. But, what happened in one case observed by this author is a not infrequent occurrence. Official inspectors and lawyers of INCORA were simply met at the gate of the hacienda by armed administrators and told that INCORA "had no land there." Further court actions were stopped when lawyers for the proprietress presented certificates attesting to her

excellent character signed by an ex-president, ex-governor of the department, a minister of the government, the present governor, and the present mayor of the capital city. That she also owned the building which housed the INCORA offices had nothing to do with the case, as the tenant INCORA officials stated that their relationship with the owner had always been most formally correct. As a conciliatory measure to the remaining two "bull-headed troublemakers" who would not give up on their suit -- and who could no longer be classified as tenants since no legal proof of their tenancy existed (and the other ex-tenants had moved away) -- the proprietress offered 15 hectares of dry land covered with brush and woods. At last word the new INCORA lawyers were trying to persuade the two ex-tenant widowers to accept the offer of the dry land located a half a day's journey from the nearest neighbors.

Although much may be legally codified concerning tenants' usufructuary rights, the objective conditions preclude much being accomplished -- especially in the coastal regions where the more backward forms of tenancy predominate. The tenants who lived and worked under such agreements were easily displaced as the landlords mechanized and modernized and avoided agrarian reform complications as well. In sum, rural land invasions do tend to occur where tenants have less security of usufructuary rights.

Colonization: Renters, of course, are not the only members of Colombia's agricultural sector who work under varying degrees of insecurity in their rights to the lands. Colonists on public lands also lack titles and the accompanying usufructuary security to the land they work.²¹ Colonization on public lands can be viewed as an escape valve mechanism to absorb a growing rural population.

Data for the area included in Colombia's 1960 agrarian census show that while colonization was of lesser importance than renting in terms of the number of farms, it was of greater importance in terms of the total farm area. Renting accounted for 23 percent of the total number of farms but for only 7 percent of the farm area, i.e., rented farms were generally smaller. Colonized units, however, accounted for less than 4 percent of the total number of farms but for over 12 percent of the total farm area, i.e., colonized farms are generally larger.

When the national data are divided between regions, rather distinctive relationships appear (see Table 12). While the national trend of the increasing importance of colonized land with increasing farm size is maintained in the interior departments, in the coastal departments such a trend is barely in evidence. The greater degree of title security of the largest coastal farms is reflected in the table, as only 6 percent of these units and 4 percent of their land lack titles -- although due to the more skewed coastal distribution they control over 50 percent of the colonized land. Such figures contrast sharply to the largest farms in the remaining departments, where over 16 percent

21. Colombian law does provide for a title to the colonist if he works the public land for five years. Land area permitted and conditions are set forth in the Colombian Agricultural Reform Law, a Translation of, Law 135. (N.A. Bogotá: Antares Ltd., January 1963), Chapters VIII and IX, pp. 20-28.

TABLE 12

COLOMBIA: FARMS OCCUPIED WITHOUT TITLE, BY SIZE
CATEGORY AND REGION, 1960

Size Category	Number of Colonized Farms as a Percent of Total Number of Farms in Size Category	Area of Colonized Farms as a Percent of Total Area in Size Category	Number of Colonized Farms in Size Category as a Percent of Total Number of Colonized Farms	Area of Colonized Farms in Size Category as a Percent of Total Area in Colonized Farms	Mean Average Size
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
-----Coastal Departments-----					
0 5	7.9	10.8	51.0	3.6	1.8
5 30	11.8	11.0	26.7	12.4	11.8
30 100	12.6	12.3	16.3	33.0	51.6
100 or more	6.7	4.1	6.0	51.0	218.0
TOTAL	9.16	5.98	100.0	100.0	25.4
-----Other Departments-----					
0 5	1.2	1.4	25.6	.5	1.9
5 30	3.7	4.3	35.3	4.9	13.2
30 100	12.0	11.9	24.2	13.1	50.9
100 or more	16.1	18.5	14.9	81.5	517.9
TOTAL	2.97	14.22	100.0	100.0	94.7

Sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960, Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 42, and the 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for the departments of Atlantico (p. 14), Bolivar (p. 16), Cordoba (p. 16) and Magdalena (p. 16). (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

of the number and 18 percent of the total area in such farms is colonized and they consequently control over 80 percent of the total untitled land.²²

A second striking difference between colonized units of the two regions shown in Table 12 is the far greater proportion of small farms under this form of tenure in the coastal area. This greater proportion of the smaller coastal farms consisting of colonized units does strongly suggest that -- due to the pressures noted earlier -- a greater effort has been made by coastal campesinos to seek the escape valve offered by frontier lands. Only in the frontier department of Meta is there a higher percentage of colonized farm units than in Atlantico, Magdalena, and Bolivar.²³

The small-scale coastal colonist on public lands faces a situation very similar to that of the colono-tenant, and as of the 1960s had fallen into perhaps an even more dismal plight. With no patron, benevolent or otherwise, to aid him in emergency situations, the colonist is truly on his own. Generally located farthest from urban centers, in "lands of no one" (Tierras de Nadia), the colonist cultivates small parcels of land for his subsistence. In the periodically flooded swamp islands and river backwashes of the coast, he plants his rice during the wet seasons, standing knee-deep in water, and plants corn, and other subsistence crops, on the higher portions. As the dry season approaches and the waters recede, these hitherto isolated inland swamps and islands become interconnected; then come the cattle herds of the latifundistas seeking newer and fresher pastures. Therefore, as the water recedes, so too does the colonist's claim to the parcel -- a man with machete and digging stick is not a match for lawyers of influential landlords, or for cattle herds guarded by armed cowboys. Although many Colombian laws dating back as far as 1873 specifically state that river islands, bottom lands subject to periodic inundation, etc., are public lands reserved for small-scale colonists of "scarce resources,"²⁴ such public lands are often disputed by latifundistas and colonists. In these rare cases where INCORA intervenes, by the time any administrative or court action is taken the autumn rains fall and the cattle return to the uplands. Then the colonist's parcels are re-seeded and perhaps harvested in a few precious months before the pattern repeats itself.

22. Of course, if Boyaca and Meta were removed from the other departments, a pattern more nearly similar to that found among the largest-sized coastal farms would be found since much of the large latifundias of these two departments consists of untitled but claimed land.

23. DANE, Censo Agropecuario, p. 22. The percentage of farm units under colonization in rank order is: Meta, 18.3 percent; Atlantico, 16.1 percent; Magdalena, 11.9 percent; and Bolivar, 9.1 percent. In the remaining departments the percentages drop off rapidly.

24. In one case of land conflict and invasion concerning such "public lands" studied by the author, INCORA passed several resolutions to affirm that these river bottom swamp lands were indeed public lands reserved by law for small-scale colonists. In its latest decree INCORA cited 14 national laws dating back to Law 106 of June 13, 1873, which specified and related to such lands as being public lands; see Resolución Numero 32, 1 de marzo de 1965 of La Junta Directiva del Instituto Colombiana de la Reforma Agraria (Bogotá E.E., Colombia).

Other colonists head further inland or back into more mountainous regions in search of "free public lands." Pushing out onto the frontier beyond penetration roads and trails, like his counterpart near the river banks, this colonist too would prefer to avoid involvement with other land claimants. However, this colonist also is finding such hiding places less and less frequent. As cattle herds encroach further onto the hilly uplands to make room for the cotton fields in the valleys, coastal latifundias are expanding at the extensive margin -- either by filling legal claims to more and more land or simply by interpreting obscure boundary lines and fixtures. Thus the colonist, if he has taken the step of filing his land claim, may often be told later that his claim conflicts with other older and larger claims, and again he must move. In other cases, extenuating family circumstances may make a latifundista's offer of a few pesos for his claim appear very attractive to the colonist and thus he may become (with luck) a colono-tenant on lands which were once "his own."

A final, and increasingly rare, category of coastal colonists include those who may be living on an ejido, or communal, lands. Individual written titles and claims are nonexistent in these cases, it being the "custom" of the region that certain, though not precisely defined, lands were "of the village." In former times, the rights to the land of the few ejidos which did exist were in large measure respected, although the village and common (often flat "prime" valley) lands were surrounded by haciendas.

The villagers worked their plots on a shifting cultivation basis--- rotating parcels rather than crops -- and supplemented their incomes by occasional labor for the owners of the neighboring haciendas. However, as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries encroached upon such rural societies, communal lands fell more and more frequently under the boundaries of the neighboring haciendas. Time took its toll upon historical parchments and special protective royal decrees governing such lands; archaic land measures of, for example, "two pesos of land" became less acceptable to the courts; and family rights to plots were sold (sometimes unknowingly) for what in the campesinos' eyes were large sums of money.

In one case studied by this author, references to a former triangular-shaped coastal ejido could be found in the national archives from 1597 to the early 1800s. After this date, no reference could be found, as a general reduction of communal lands occurred during the early post-independence era.²⁵ While the few hundred present-day inhabitants of the now disintegrating community claim that as late as 1940 their common lands encompassed roughly 1000 hectares, today only 20 hectares of land which border the immediate village area remain within the hands of one family. This fortunate family has kept its lands from the encroaching latifundias because of a "special" relationship the grandfather enjoyed with the neighboring landlord, who created his latifundia principally by buying out the colonos. The remaining villagers now depend upon the goodwill of the heirs to the latifundia for occasional employment as cowboys and cotton pickers, although many have migrated throughout the coastal region in search of employment. To prevent the villagers from re-occupying

25. See J. Friede, "La Evolución de la Propiedad Territorial en Colombia," Hacia Una Reforma Masiva, Colección Monografías y Documentos, no. 8 (Bogotá, Centro de Investigación y Acción Social, 1971), pp. 23-60.

their former lands, the latifundista's heirs have constructed a brick wall with broken glass embedded upon it along one side of the village and a barbed wire and mesh fence through the middle of the stream which borders the other edge. The cattle of the latifundia now pollute this source of water for the villagers, who have had to dig a well to replace their once crystal-clear stream. A highway and the 20 hectares complete the now very precise and distinguishable boundaries of this once-flourishing ejido.

In summary, while it appears that a greater effort has been made among small-scale farmers of the coastal areas to colonize public land, these persons too enjoy little usufructuary security to the lands they claim. These insecure small holdings in the coastal regions were also among the first to feel the pressures of increased demands for crop and pasture land which accompanied the 1960 boom period of the commercialization of cotton and rice cultivation. In short, the argument that pre-conditions for rural land invasions exist where the land occupants have lesser degrees of usufructuary security is strengthened by the high frequency of small-scale colonists in the coastal areas. Confronted with the pressures of population growth and decreasing access to frontier land as agricultural mechanization and commercialization increased in the region, ex-colonists pushed off the public lands also participated in the region's rural land invasions of the 1960s.

The Landless: The final members of the rural population to be examined here vis à vis their security of usufructuary rights to the land do not even claim any such rights. Landless agricultural laborers, almost by definition, have the least degree of job security in rural Colombia. While a few plantation workers are unionized, unions are not notoriously strong organizations in Colombia, and the few unions which do exist among agricultural workers are even less noted for their ability to gain job security for their members.²⁶

These workers have the least amount of job security of all in Colombia's agricultural sector and hence are presumably among the first to be displaced from their sources of livelihood. Such workers were specifically listed in the earlier quoted paragraph of the Colombian agrarian reform statute, Law 135 of 1961, as to be converted into owners of the land that they work. However, the enabling legislation to that statute, Law 1 of 1968, neglected to mention such workers.

In the coastal region, as of 1960, landless agricultural laborers accounted for nearly one-third of all the agricultural families, exceeded in numbers and proportion only by the combined total of all the small-scale owners, renters, and colonists of the region. Individually, small-scale owners accounted for 22 percent of the rural families, renters 14 percent, and colonists, etc., for 8 percent, all far below the 31 percent of the coastal rural families who were landless laborers.²⁷

26. See M. Urrutia, The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

27. The remaining categories of family sized and larger farmers, plus administrators account for the remaining 25 percent of the rural coastal families. See C.I.D.A., Tenencia de la Tierra, Appendice L-3, p. 398. Additionally C.I.D.A. defines small-scale farms as being "sub-family units," too small to support two full-time workers.

TABLE 13

COLOMBIA: LANDLESS AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS AND REGION, 1960

---Landless Agricultural Workers as a percentage of---

Region	Agricultural Families	Active Agricultural Population	Total Agricultural Population
Coastal Departments	31.4	25.8	24.6
Other Departments	2.9	2.3	2.0

Source: C.I.D.A., Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-Económico del Sector Agrícola Colombia (Washington, D. C., Unión Panamericana, 1966), Appendices L-1 and L-3, pp. 396 and 398.

This fact contrasts remarkably with what is found in the remainder of Colombia, where only 2.9 percent of the rural families are landless laborers. In the interior region the small-scale owners constitute 31.6 percent of the rural families - by far the largest single category, followed by owners of family-sized farms at 19.3 percent and renters of small farms at 16 percent of the rural families.²⁸

Of the 118,000 rural families without any land in Colombia as of 1960, 72.7 percent of them were found to be concentrated within the four coastal departments.²⁹ Occupying the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder, these persons could offer the least amount of resistance to displacement, whether it be due to the combined factors of agrarian reform statutes and increasing mechanization or simply to the whim of the employing landlord.

The Cotton Boom: Throughout the preceding sections reference has been made to the peasants being shunted aside by the increased commercialization and mechanization of the region's agriculture. This section will briefly describe the dimensions of that process as reflected in the increase in cotton cultivation.

Between 1959-60 and 1965 the cultivated land area in Colombia planted to crops increased by 18 percent.³⁰ In the coastal departments the cultivated

28. Ibid., Appendice L-1, p. 396.

29. Ibid.

30. DANE, Censo Agropecuario, and DANE, Encuesta Agropecuaria Nacional 1965 (Bogotá: agosto de 1966). Figures do not include fallow land.

land area planted to crops increased by 159.54 percent during the same time period.³¹ The land area planted to cotton in the coastal departments, however, increased by over 235 percent (from 38,814 to 120,283 hectares) during that time, while in the other departments there was only a 7.7 percent increase in the area planted to cotton (from 41,487 to 44,704 hectares). Hence, while as early as 1959-60 the coastal departments accounted for 48 percent of area planted to cotton, by 1965 over 72 percent of Colombia's cotton crop was grown in the coastal departments. Inevitably, there was conversion of land use patterns in the region as cotton fields replaced other forms of usages.

While it is true that many of the costefios, as well as people from the interior departments, followed the cotton harvest, it is highly doubtful if the wages they received compensated for their previous low but secure incomes. In 1969 the cotton growers association of the department of Cesar warned would-be cotton pickers not to expect any get-rich-quick schemes. The association placed ads in the papers stating that:

- (1) The piece rate paid would be 40 centavos (about U.S. \$0.025) per kilo (2.2 pounds);
- (2) That in order to collect such a rate the cotton pickers must go through two collections; in the first approximately 75 percent of the cotton would be harvested and several weeks later a second collection would be made for the rest;
- (3) If a worker only harvested the first collection he would only be paid 28 centavos per kilo;
- (4) That an expert fast picker could harvest about 80 kilos per day and an inept picker only about half that amount;
- (5) That food costs in the area alone would cost the picker at least 12 pesos (U.S. \$0.72) per day.³²

While these ads were placed in the papers to correct mistaken ideas of the poor people in Colombia, the reality of the coastal cotton harvest displays an even worse situation. To collect the 40 centavos per kilo harvested, the worker had to remain in the area or return to the same fields several weeks later. Often the record of the campesino having previously worked in that field is "lost" or "misplaced," etc., so that all the campesino is paid for both the first and second collection is 28 centavos per kilo. To pick 80 kilos of cotton, even on the first pass when the cotton is abundant, is a most strenuous task. But even if a man could pick that amount, he would only earn at

31. Ibid. Of course the coastal increase was included in the total figure. If not, increase in cultivated area planted to crops in the non-coastal departments would be even less than the 18 percent. It is posited here that if and when another agrarian census is published in Colombia it will show a remarkable decline in the proportion of small-scale renters, colonists, etc., in the coastal departments, as their parcels were encompassed by the cotton boom.

32. El Espectador (Bogotá), 23 de enero de 1970, p. 4.

that time 22.40 pesos for his efforts, out of which he must purchase food and lodging. The cotton growers association placed the daily food costs alone at 53 percent of that amount. While it is possible to be fed for 12 pesos, I noted rather sharp increases in food prices during the cotton harvest period in the course of my travels in the coastal area. To save the remaining 47 percent of his wage a harvester must not spend any more money on anything -- and indeed many were observed sleeping in the open and washing clothes in public fountains. If a cotton picker remains in the area after the first collection, his net earnings are eaten up. In any case, during the second harvest the campesinos report that it is impossible to collect anywhere near 80 kilos of cotton in one day; 40 kilos a day would be considered a good achievement, which would not even cover the 12 peso food cost.

In short, cotton harvesting is not lucrative employment for the pickers. High costs of living, wages held back by employers to ensure that the people will return for the second collection, and wages unfairly withheld by the field foremen are the most common complaints voiced by the harvest hands. While the conditions of poverty ensure that a vast number of people are willing to accept whatever conditions are offered for any employment, their aim is merely to subsist rather than to get rich. Cotton harvesting is viewed as a poor alternative to having access to the land as a worker, colonist, or renter under almost any form of tenancy.

Summary: We have seen that, compared to the rest of the nation, the coastal departments exhibited characteristics which -- given the lack of urban employment alternatives for a rural population -- could logically be expected to give rise to rural unrest and land invasions. The distribution of land was more highly skewed in these departments and the traditional extensively utilized latifundias controlled considerably more land than did their interior counterparts, while the bulk of the rural population was forced to subsist on smaller proportion of the land than did the campesinos of the inland Andean departments.

Not only was there a greater proportion of minifundias controlling less land in the Caribbean region, it was also demonstrated that these small farmers had less usufructuary security to the meager amount of land they operated. The predominance of renters and colonists, combined with the fact that nearly one-third of the coastal rural population consisted of landless laborers produced a very delicate equilibrium situation in the region, wherein over 50 percent of the rapidly growing rural population was highly dependent upon the traditional goodwill of a few, nearly all-powerful latifundistas.

Such a rural system can only survive if it remains closed. The balance in the coastal system broke down in the 1960s as a result of two factors: the potential threat of agrarian reform legislation to convert workers and small-scale renters into owners, and the introduction of mechanized large-scale production of cotton. While the cotton boom meant prosperity for the large landowners, it hardly brought similar benefits to the displaced rural inhabitants who found in it only seasonal employment at low wages. In short, in the 1960s rural land invasions were the result of new forces and prosperity in the rural sector -- but a prosperity which only included a few in its benefits.

Capital

I will turn now to an examination of the capital-labor factor proportions employed in agriculture and of the major components and institutions of Colombia's agrarian credit system.

Capital Stock and Factor Proportions: The factor proportions -- as measured by the relationship between the use of capital and labor -- are one means to examine the costeños campesinos' vulnerability to displacement by mechanization. A more detailed examination of the factor mix can be obtained by ranking farms on a continuum of modernization -- with farms employing only human labor at one end and highly capitalized and mechanized units at the other.

Table 14 shows that coastal farms, even the relatively large ones, were much more heavily dependent on human labor than their interior counterparts.³³ Further, even when coastal farms did use animal power they did so far less than interior farms of comparable size.³⁴ The pattern holds true for machinery use until the very largest coastal farms are reached. On the coast these units are used for commercial cultivation of cotton and rice. Also, the coastal topography makes mechanization a more feasible alternative than in the hilly interior. It is evident that the overwhelming dependency of the coastal units solely on human labor is accounted for by the fact that the bulk of the rural coastal population are nonowners, hence having less security to make large and long-term investments in animals and/or machinery.

There was a marked growth in increases of capital stocks in Colombia following World War II as export markets improved, foreign loans for purchase of machinery were secured, and special subsidized exchange rates for machinery imports were established. The number of tractors in the country as a whole more than doubled between 1953 and 1963. In 1953, 17 percent of all tractors in Colombia were in the coastal region; by 1959-60 this had increased to 21 percent. The number of coastal hectares per tractor went down from 342 in 1953 to 217 in 1960, despite an 83 percent increase in the number of hectares cultivated in the coast. These machines were used principally to prepare soil for planting, including the opening up of previously uncultivated lands. Thus they displaced large numbers of campesinos who had formerly performed these tasks. Some seasonal employment was created in cotton harvesting (the only unmechanized operation for that crop) but, as we have seen, it was a poor substitute for even the least secure forms of tenancy.

33. If departments were ranked in terms of the percentages of farms employing no animal or mechanical power, Bolivar would lead with 97.7 percent, followed by Atlantico with 96 percent, and Magdalena at 95 percent; Cordoba ranks fifth at 87 percent. Boyaca has the smallest percentage of such farms -- 28 percent. DANE, Censo Agropecuario, p. 32.

34. In addition to the insecure tenure status of many coastal farmers, there may be a biological explanation for this fact. Oxen are the draft animal in Colombia, and they have never been successfully adapted to the hot and humid coastal lowlands. Burros are common on the coast, but they are used for riding rather than as draft animals. Horses are a "status" animal, not used for draft power.

TABLE 14

COLOMBIA: ENERGY SOURCES FOR AGRICULTURAL
WORK BY REGION AND BY FARM SIZE, 1960

-----Coastal Departments-----				-----Other Departments-----					
Farm Size in Hectares	Percent		Percent	Percent		Percent		Percent	
	Farms Using Human Energy	Percent Farms Using draft Animals	Using Farms and Mech- anical Power	Farms Using Mech- anical Power	Farms Using Only Human Energy	Percent Farms Using draft Animals	Farms Using and Mech- anical Power	Using Farms and Mech- anical Power	Percent Farms Using Mech- anical Power
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	
0 5	99.1	0.7	0.1	0.1	66.5	28.6	3.3	1.6	
5 30	92.7	6.0	0.5	0.8	49.7	40.9	5.6	3.8	
30 40	86.5	11.5	0.7	1.3	45.0	42.9	6.0	6.1	
40 50	85.0	12.3	0.5	2.2	43.5	44.1	6.3	6.1	
50 100	82.9	13.7	1.2	2.2	43.4	43.2	6.5	6.9	
30 100	84.2	12.8	1.1	1.9	43.9	43.3	6.3	6.5	
100 200	76.6	17.9	2.2	3.3	40.2	42.9	8.4	8.5	
200 500	66.1	22.7	4.7	6.5	34.8	44.4	10.7	10.1	
500 1000	52.7	22.6	11.2	13.5	28.9	44.7	14.9	11.5	
1000 2500	38.3	24.2	18.4	19.1	21.8	49.2	17.8	11.2	
2500 or more	19.9	17.8	29.8	32.5	9.2	62.5	21.4	6.9	
100 or more	68.2	20.2	5.1	6.5	36.0	44.3	10.3	9.4	
TOTAL	93.51	4.87	0.65	0.97	59.60	33.37	4.30	2.73	

Source: DANE, Directorio Nacional de Explotaciones Agropecuarias (Censo Agropecuario), 1960: Resumen Nacional (Segunda Parte) (Bogotá, febrero de 1964), p. 56, and the 1960 Departmental Agrarian Censuses for Atlántico, p. 24, Bolívar, p. 34, Córdoba, p. 31, and Magdalena, p. 31 (Bogotá, diciembre de 1964).

Allocation of Official Credit in Colombia: An Overview: There are four main channels of official agricultural loans in Colombia (see the headings to Table 15). Traditionally they have tended to favor borrowers who possess a capacity for repayment in the form of real goods. Hence livestock enterprises have received 50 percent or more of all official credit in recent years, leaving only about 45 percent for the vast majority of Colombian farms.

It is evident that the bulk of this credit has gone to the larger farmers. Table 16 gives some data on loan sizes for the Banco Ganadero and the Caja de Credito Agraria. Clearly, they were not allocated to the average campesino, whose net worth rarely exceeds P. 1,784.

INCORA instituted its supervised credit program in 1963, but has never exceeded 5 percent of total official credit. Its initial focus was on the campesino, but later it began to pull back and focus both on larger farms,³⁵ and on servicing clients located on its own irrigation and parcelation projects.

To more clearly reveal the skewed nature of official agricultural credit in Colombia, it will be useful to focus on the institution which has accounted for nearly one-half of all such credit (see Table 15).

The Caja de Credito Agraria, Industrial, y Minero: Although the Caja's relative contribution to institutionalized agrarian credit has declined somewhat in recent years, it is still by far the largest single credit institution in Colombia, with more than 650 branch offices throughout the country. As recently as the mid-1950s it was the largest single bank in all of Latin America.

The concept upon which the Caja was founded in 1931 was that it should serve as a source of institutionalized credit for campesinos who did not qualify for loans from the commercial banks. The bank claims to have retained that "democratic" orientation throughout its existence, offering as proof its relatively small average loan size and its relatively easy credit requirements.

The size of the Caja's loans do indeed appear to put them well within the reach of the campesinos (see Table 17). Even in the coastal departments, where the average loan size was considerably larger than for the rest of the country, the size of the loans made by the Caja does not even approach the size of those made by the private and cattle banks.

Maximum amounts available for loans vary with the purpose of the loan, e.g., machinery, housing, irrigation equipment, etc. Loans are guaranteed mainly by mortgaging future crops and/or livestock increases (more than 50

35. USAID's preliminary data, based on a sample of 167 of 4,000 farms receiving INCORA supervised credit in 1969, revealed that the mean average size of farms receiving this credit was 45 hectares and the median size was 22 hectares. See Colombia, Agriculture Sector Analysis, General Working Document No. 178, Sector Analysis and Strategy Staff, AFD-LA/CDR/SASS, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C., October 22, 1971), p. 5.

TABLE 15

COLOMBIA: PERCENT ALLOCATION OF
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT BY AGENCY,
1958-67

Year	Commercial ¹ Banks	Caja Agraria	INCORA	Other ²
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1958 ^a	40	60		
1959 ^a	45	55		
1960	50	45		
1961	49	43		7
1962	50	48		2
1963	51	48		1
1964	45	43	1	11
1965	58	30	2	10
1966	45	39	4	12
1967	44	38	5	13
Average	48	44	1	7

Sources: ^aCaja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Informe de la Gerencia 1963 (Bogotá, 1963), p. 19.

Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Los Problemas del Credito Agropecuario y el Desarrollo Economico en Colombia, Trabajo Presentado al Seminario Latinoamericano Sobre Credito Rural Celebrando en El Salvador (octubre de 1968), p. 131.

¹Commercial Banks include the many private banks of Colombia as well as the Livestock Bank (Banco Ganadero) and The Coffee Federation Bank (Banco Cafetero).

²Includes the Fund for Livestock Development (Fondo Ganadero), The Rotary Fund of the Coffee Growers (Fondo Rotatorio de la Federacion de Cafeteros), and the Private Finance Corporations (Corporaciones Financieras).

percent) or by personal signature (43 percent).³⁶ Both of these forms of guarantee are utilized mainly by campesinos who have established a "good

36. These are, of course, much less stringent guarantees than those demanded by private banks, but since the latter's loans are much larger, the differences are hardly surprising.

TABLE 16

BANCO GANADERO: LOAN DISTRIBUTION
BY SIZE, 1968

Size of Loans (pesos)*	Percent of Number of Loans	Percent of Value of Loans
(1)	(2)	(3)
0 50,000	75.9	36.2
50,000 170,000	20.7	38.5
170,000 700,000	3.2	17.7
More than 700,000	.2	7.6
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

*P=\$0.058 \$US.

Source: Banco Ganadero, Informe de Gerencia del Banco Ganadero, 1968 (Bogotá, 1968) as cited in Suarez, G. A. and Martínez, A. O., Fuentes de Crédito Agropecuario en Colombia: Analisis y Proyecciones, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia junio de 1970), p. 47.

CAJA DE CREDITO AGRARIO, INDUSTRIAL
Y MINERO: DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIAL
DEVELOPMENT FUNDS* BY CAPITAL WORTH
OF LOAN RECIPIENT, 1968

Capital Worth of Loan Recipient (Pesos)	Percent of Number of Loans	Percent of Value of Loans	Average Size of Loan (Pesos)
100,000	0	0	0
100,000 200,000	31.6	15.4	32,392
200,000 500,000	21.1	14.8	46,634
500,000 1,000,000	22.0	20.5	61,947
1,000,000 1,500,000	11.7	14.2	80,688
1,500,000 or more	13.6	35.1	171,628
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>X= 66,479</u>

Source: Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial Y Minero, "Distribucion de la Cartera de la Caja Segun el Capital de los Usuarios," Informe de Gerencia 1968 (Bogotá, 1968), p. 9 and Annexos.

*"Cartera de Fomento y Especial," comprising the programs of Cattle Development (Fondo Ganadero), Machinery (Maquinaria Empresito), Other Demands (Exedentes Agricolas), Agricultural Finance Fund (Fondo Financiera Agricola), Banana Fund (Fondo Bananero), and other supervised loans (Prestamos Diregidos).

TABLE 17

CAJA DE CREDITO AGRARIO, INDUSTRIAL, Y
MINERO: AVERAGE SIZE OF LOANS^a, 1956
AND 1960-1968

YEAR	Coastal Departments	-----Nationwide-----		
	Average Size Loan (Current Peso)	Average Size Loan (Current Peso)	Average Size Loan ^b (Real Terms) (1961 = 100)	Average Size Loan ^c (U.S. Dollars)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1956	3,517	2,072	-----	-----
1960	-----	2,909	-----	-----
1961	4,313	2,611	2,611	389
1962	-----	-----	-----	-----
1963	-----	-----	-----	-----
1964	5,954	4,730	3,107	525
1965	6,919	4,981	3,022	553
1966	-----	5,593	2,893	622
1967	-----	6,125	2,963	375
1968	11,508	7,191	3,273	435

Sources: 1956 - Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Informe de Gerencia 1965 (Bogotá, 1965), p. 21.

1960 - Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Informe de Gerencia 1960 (Bogotá, 1960), pp. 53-71.

1961 - C.I.D.A., Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-Economico del Sector Agricola: Colombia (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1966) p. 184.

1964-1968 - DANE, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica No. 222 (Bogotá, enero de 1970), Anexos.

1964, 1965 and 1968 (Coast) Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Informes de Gerencia (1964, 1965 and 1968) (Bogotá, 1964, 1965 and 1968), Anexos.

credit record" with the Caja.³⁷ Interest rates are lower than those charged by the various private banks.

Table 18 demonstrates clearly that small loans made by the Caja have declined both in absolute numbers and in the relative percentage of total credit disbursed. Similarly, larger loans have increased in number and in the relative share of credit they claim. These changes have also resulted in an absolute decrease in the amount of money loaned by the Caja to the campesino subsector. For example, while the total amount of credit disbursed by the Caja increased by 150,299,568 pesos between 1966 and 1967, the absolute amount allocated to small loans actually decreased by 109,264,897 pesos. To put it in \$US terms, while total loans increased by \$US 9 million between 1966 and 1967, the campesinos' share decreased by over \$US 6.6 million and the share of the better-off borrowers increased by over \$US 17 million. The shift is further confirmed by an examination of the capital worth of loan recipients.

Examination of the Caja's loans for specific purposes also casts considerable doubt upon its claimed campesino orientation.³⁸ Nearly one-half of the Caja's total credit is allocated to livestock, although the vast bulk of Colombia's rural populace are farmers, not ranchers; this credit is not allocated for family livestock purchases but for large-scale cattle-ranching. Non-livestock, or agricultural, loans were mainly consumed by machinery loans averaging well over several thousands of dollars. Even crop loans went increasingly in large blocks of credit to the commercial crops -- cotton, bananas, and cacao. Table 19 provides an overview of allocation of loans, by purpose and by region.

Table 20 provides a similar view of loans by tenure category. It reveals that no trend is in evidence, but sharecroppers have regularly received only about 2 percent of the Caja's total credit and have consistently received the smallest-sized loans of all the tenure groups.

Similarly, the tenure group of "colonists" has not experienced any change in relative importance in the Caja's loan record, receiving just 8 percent of the loans, and accounting for about 6.5 percent of the Caja's credit. If any trend is evidenced for the colonist, it appears that since 1963 they have been receiving a diminishing percentage of the credit.

While colonists and renters (not including the fixed payment tenancy) make up a considerable proportion of Colombia's farm sector, they do not share

37. Typically, for a campesino to first gain credit from the Caja he must mortgage his crops and have two other persons with good credit records guarantee repayment of his loan. After one or two years of this, the campesino is accepted as a good risk and allowed to personally guarantee his own loans.

38. For a detailed examination of loans by purpose see R. Soles, "Rural Land Invasions in Colombia: A Study of the Macro- and Micro-Conditions and Forces Leading to Peasant Unrest" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972), Chap. 4, App. 1, pp. 220-37.

TABLE 18

COLOMBIA: CAJA DE CREDITO AGRARIO, INDUSTRIAL
Y MINERO: DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT DISBURSED BY
LOAN SIZE, 1960-61, 1966, and 1967

Size of Loan (Current Peso)	-----1960-61-----		-----1966-----		-----1967-----	
	Percent of Number	Percent of Value	Percent of Number	Percent of Value	Percent of Number	Percent of Value
Less than 250	2.8	0.2	23.8	3.2	17.7	2.0
250 1,000	45.2	11.5				
1,000 5,000	42.0	36.5	57.1	29.9	59.7	23.2
5,000 10,000	-----	-----	9.9	15.7	11.5	12.6
10,000 20,000	8.2	31.2	8.1	38.1	9.3	33.1
20,000 50,000	1.7	18.4				
50,000 or more	0.1	2.2	1.1	13.1	1.8	29.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: CIDA, Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-Economico del Sector Agricola: Colombia (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1966) p. 187.

Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Carta Agraria No. 200 (Bogotá, 1967).

Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero, Informe de Gerencia 1967 (Bogotá, 1967) as cited in Suarez, G. A., and Martinez, A. O., Fuentes del Credito Agropecuario en Colombia: Analisis y Proyecciones, Departamento de Economia, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, junio, 1970).

TABLE 19

COLOMBIA: CAJA DE CREDITO AGRARIO,
INDUSTRIAL Y MINERO: PERCENT OF
TOTAL FUNDS ALLOCATED NATIONALLY
AND IN THE COASTAL DEPARTMENTS TO
THE CAMPESINO SUBSECTOR, 1964-1968

LOAN CATEGORY	1964		1965		1966	1967	1968	
	Natl	Coast	Natl	Coast	Natl	Natl	Natl	Coast
Farm Mortgages	4.9	0.7	4.4	1.7	3.4	5.1	4.1	1.7
Other Infra- structural Loans*	7.2	4.1	4.7	3.8	4.3	5.5	5.3	3.5
Crop Loans of Average Size Less than 10,000 Cur- rent Pesos	24.2	19.1	29.9	21.7	33.1	33.1	26.8	26.2
Percent of Total Credit	36.3	23.9	39.0	27.2	40.8	43.7	36.2	31.4

Sources: Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial, y Minero, Informes de Gerencia (1964, 1965, and 1968) (Bogotá, 1964, 1965, and 1968).

DANE, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica No. 222 (Bogotá, enero de 1970).

*Excluding Machinery

in proportional terms the Caja's loan programs. Though in 1960 they comprised over 32 percent of the number of farm units in Colombia and occupied over 25 percent of the land, throughout the 1960s they received only 16 percent of the number of the Caja's loans and only 10.9 percent of credit disbursed. It does not appear, therefore, that the Caja, on a national basis, has made any concerted effort to alter the tenure structure of Colombian agriculture. In fact, more than just allocating its credit on a proportional basis according to tenure groups, its loan programs come down heavily weighted on the side of owners and large-scale commercial renters. While regional data are unavailable as to loans to tenure groups, where such data are available they indicate the Caja's loan program to be even more skewed away from the campesino class in the coastal regions. It is probably safe to assume that the operations of the Caja's branch banks in the coastal regions would continue to reflect such differences if measured on this variable of loans to tenure groups.

Overall, the coastal campesinos received a smaller proportion of campesino-oriented Cajás' funds than the rest of the nation. In short, the coastal rural population, rapidly growing in numbers, but facing decreased employment

TABLE 20

CAJA DE CREDITO AGRARIO, INDUSTRIAL Y
MINERO: LOANS TO TENURE GROUPS AS PER-
CENT* OF TOTAL NUMBER AND TOTAL VALUE
OF LOANS AND AVERAGE SIZE OF LOANS,
1961-1967

(1) Year	PERCENT OF NUMBER OF LOANS			
	(2) Owners	(3) Renters	(4) Sharecroppers	(5) Colonists
1961	72.3	12.4	4.9	8.0
1962	69.5	14.6	4.7	8.9
1963	68.4	15.2	4.6	9.6
1964	67.3	16.8	4.8	8.8
1965	67.1	11.9	3.9	6.2
1966	67.9	15.9	5.3	8.0
1967	70.1	14.8	5.2	7.2
\bar{x} 1961-67	68.95	14.5	4.7	8.0

PERCENT OF CREDIT RECEIVED BY:

Year	Owners	Renters	Sharecroppers	Colonists
1961	76.1	12.6	2.3	6.7
1962	75.0	14.1	2.1	7.2
1963	74.1	14.5	1.9	7.9
1964	72.3	16.4	2.1	7.5
1965	70.7	17.6	2.4	6.4
1966	70.1	18.9	2.3	5.8
1967	73.1	17.2	2.3	5.1
\bar{x} 1961-67	72.7	16.4	2.3	6.5

AVERAGE SIZE OF LOAN RECEIVED BY:

Year	Owners	Renters	Sharecroppers	Colonists
1961	2,914	2,812	1,323	2,314
1962	3,382	3,043	1,391	2,548
1963	3,709	3,272	1,474	2,789
1964	4,265	3,878	1,738	3,357
1965	4,714	4,904	2,058	3,288
1966	5,344	6,107	2,182	3,717
1967	6,227	6,919	2,589	4,156
\bar{x} 1961-67	4,365	4,433	1,822	3,167

Sources: Caja de Credito Agrario Industrial y Minero, Informe de la Gerencia 1967 (Bogotá, 1967), as cited in DANE, Boletín Mensual de Estadística No. 222 (Bogotá, 1970) p., 172.

*Less than 100 Percent total because of exclusion of "other" category.

Alternatives as the modernization-mechanization process occurs in the commercial agricultural sector, have found little opportunity through Colombia's credit institutions to ameliorate their plight. In fact, the flow of institutionalized credit has worked decidedly against them.

II. LAND AND CAPITAL ON THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL

The following description and analysis is based on 10 "invasion municipios" studied by the author during 1969 and 1970.³⁹ Within 9 of these municipios, 14 case studies of rural land invasions were made; the remaining municipio, in the department of Atlantico, was not intensively researched because of its unique situation, which has already been well investigated, documented, and publicized.⁴⁰ Of the peasant organizations involved, 8 were affiliated with FANAL (Federacion Agraria Nacional), 5 with the CTC (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia) and 1 with the Usuarios. As will be shown, 5 of the groups had "won" some degree of security and usufructuary rights to their parcels, either through the intervention of the courts and/or INCORA, or by the invaders agreeing to buy their land parcels. The most recent of these successful cases occurred in 1968 and the oldest dated back to 1961. In 3 cases, while there was still conflict between the owners and the invaders, the invaders had been on the land for over one year at the time of the interviews. In 4 other cases the capesinos were actually in the process of invading at the time of the interviews. Finally 2 cases must be termed "special cases" because neither group was on the land at the time of the interviews.

There is the question of just how representative these cases and their respective municipios are of the conditions and processes of the coastal land invasions in general. Of the 6 recent cases studied, 4 were selected for study prior to field research on the basis of newspaper articles. The 2 remaining recent cases were selected in the field in conjunction with departmental union personnel, who also accompanied and introduced the author to all of the groups studied. In no case did the departmental personnel of the various organizations impose any restrictions upon me as to which particular groups would or should be studied.

The older, more established invasion groups were selected from a list drawn up by the union's departmental personnel. Some local non-affiliated

39. One of the invasion municipios was in the "northern corridor" of the department of Antioquia, i.e., not in any of the four coastal departments. This section is quite distinct from the inland mountainous region of Antioquia and hence was considered part of the coastal area.

40. See V. Bonilla, "De La Lucha por la Tierra: At Atlantico Tres," Tierra Revista de Economia Agricola (Bogotá), no. 4 (abril-junio 1967). and Alfonso Londoño B., L.P., et al., Estudio Sociologico Sobre Cinco Comunidades del Sur del Departamento del Atlantico, Departamento de Investigaciones Sociales, Facultad de Sociologica (Medellín, Colombia: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, 1969).

groups may have escaped inclusion in the list. There is also the possibility that there may have been affiliated groups which the organization's personnel did not include on the list for various reasons. It is my judgment, however, that this is only a remote possibility.

In 2 cases, I attempted to study invasion groups which were not affiliated with any national group. Both times, my efforts were rebuffed. A gringo in the midst of an area of strife was simply not to be trusted, no matter what attempts -- including a local residency of close to four consecutive months -- were made. The struggle for the precious land is simply too important a matter to be endangered by speaking freely with an outsider. Hence, what follows can only be claimed to be representative of the municipios and cases actually studied. The geographic locations of these municipios are shown in Figure 1. The municipios are numbered 1 to 10, moving from west to east. In the following analysis, they shall be referred to by these numbers for identification.

An analysis of the concentration of land holdings in the invasion municipios reveals that they had a higher degree of concentration than neighboring municipios (except in the four where INCORA had subsequently intervened) and that this distribution of land was becoming more highly concentrated throughout the period 1959-70 (with the same exception).

The data are inconclusive on the issue of security of tenure since no figures are available on the municipio level as to the proportion of landless laborers (they comprise 31 percent of the total regional population). Comparison of invasion and neighboring municipios as to the number of owner-operators and least secure tenants reveals no clear trend in favor of either group.

When one measures the amount of land available for colonization, however, a very different picture emerges: the invasion municipios had a much higher percentage of their geographic land area claimed in farm units than their neighbors. Further, the percentage of the municipal area in farm units was increasing throughout the 1960s in the invasion municipios as in the neighboring areas. This especially evident in municipio 1, where a near doubling of the farm area appears to have taken place between 1960 and 1969.

Cultivation of cotton helps to explain the relatively high concentration of land holdings in actual farm units. Even as early as 1960 invasion municipios cultivated more cotton and were more highly mechanized than their neighbors. The comparison is greater today. That the rural people were at best only marginal participants in this ongoing process can be implied from the flow of institutionalized credit to these municipios.

The total amount of credit allocated by the Caja to coastal departments increased by 59 percent between 1964 and 1968. In the invasion municipios the increase was 72 percent. Table 21 reveals, however, that the amount of this credit disbursed in small loans decreased from 22 percent in 1964 to only 9 percent in 1969. Where did the money go? To the commercial crops, principally cotton, which in 1969 received over 53 percent of all Caja loans in the invasion municipios. As of 1966 the amount loaned for the three commercial crops exceeded the total amounts of credit issued by the Caja for all other crops combined. From then on, the amounts allocated to the three commercial crops were more than double the total amounts allocated for campesino crops in the invasion municipios.




FIGURE 1: Geographic Location of Ten Invasion Municipios Studied in Colombia's Caribbean Coastal Area, Based on 1960 Political Boundaries

TABLE 21

CAJA DE CREDITO AGRARIO, INDUSTRIAL Y MINERO:
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY SIZE
IN NINE COASTAL MUNICIPIOS, SELECTED BY YEARS

Size of Loan (Current Peso)	1964		1965		1967		1968		1969	
	Percent of:		Percent of:		Percent of:		Percent of:		Percent of:	
	No. Credit of Loan	Dis- bursed	No. Credit of Loan	Dis- bursed	No. Credit of Loan	Dis- bursed	No. Credit of Loan	Dis- bursed	No. Credit of Loan	Dis- bursed
Less than 5,000	74	22	71	20	66	17	64	13	63	9
5,000 - 10,000	11	12	12	13	13	19	14	8	13	5
More than 10,000	15	66	17	67	21	64	22	79	24	86
(More than 50,000)		(21)		(17)		(56)		(57)		(71)

Source: Files of the Departamento de Credito, Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero (Bogotá, August 17, 1970).

In general, then, it can be said it was found that conditions in the invasion municipios were even more extreme or pronounced than indicated by the regional or departmental data, at least when the invasion municipios were compared to their neighboring municipios.

The distribution of the land was more highly concentrated in the invasion municipios than in the neighboring municipios and it was becoming increasingly concentrated throughout the 1960s -- except in those invasion municipios where INCORA had intervened. Alternative frontier land was less likely to be found in these municipios as the farm units expanded their borders. Though few colonists and tenants of insecure forms of tenancy were encountered, this may be due to the fact that even as early as 1960 the invasion municipios were already well into the modernization-mechanization process, as exemplified by the large proportion of cultivated lands in cotton and/or the relatively high degrees of mechanization.

That the figures from the decade of the 1960s portray the deteriorating position of the campesinos in these municipios should not be surprising when the distribution of agricultural credit from even the "campesino-oriented" Caja Agraria is examined. The figures showed that a rapidly diminishing portion of the Caja's credit could be termed "campesino oriented," even when the absolute levels were noted. Except for the early years of 1964 and of 1965, cotton alone received more credit than all of the combined credit allocated to the campesinos in these municipios. Hence, the process of the enlarging farm units, as witnessed by the increasing concentration of the distribution of the land, and the vanishing frontier lands as more and more land was put into

large commercial units and fields -- hence the expelling of the rural populace and the breaking down of the traditional rural relationships. With few alternative employment possibilities or public lands available for colonization, many groups of the rural populace therefore increasingly turned towards rural land invasions in these municipios.

III. A REVIEW OF RURAL LAND INVASION CASES

On the Researching of the Case Studies

I have already described how the case studies were selected in conjunction with the various campesino organizations' national and departmental personnel; these leaders also played an important role in introducing the author to the various local groups. The scenario of these introductions generally adhered to the following sequence:

First, the local union leaders were contacted by the author, accompanied by the organizations' departmental personnel. At these informal meetings the purpose and design of the study was explained and the many questions of the local leaders answered. Often times these informal gatherings extended over several days as other organizational officials (and members) would arrive or be asked to participate. When a general consensus had been arrived at by the leaders to agree to participate in this study, a date -- generally a few days hence -- was set to call a general meeting of the union members to determine if they too were agreeable to participate in the study. As we have seen, the only cases where the leaders, etc., were not amenable to the study occurred when I attempted to interview local groups which did not have departmental or national affiliation.

At the general meeting the purpose and design of the study was explained. I simply told the members that this study was not part of any organization's attempt to divine or divulge any secrets of this group to either punish or reward them, to raise taxes, etc. They were told that while information would be solicited concerning their group and their individual lives, incomes, motivations, etc., no names would be asked and their group and location would not be identified other than as one of a number of examples of rural land invasions in the coastal region of Colombia. Only their national and departmental organizations, in addition to themselves, would receive a transcript of the meeting and a summarized copy of the questionnaires.

It was also explained that this study was not being conducted to relay complaints to any agency or government so that their specific problems could be ameliorated. They were told frankly that, although a gringo, I did not have any palanca (influence or "pull" with those in authority). I did state, however, that I hoped that this study would be read by those persons and agencies who are concerned about gaining a greater understanding of the reality of the conditions and forces operative in rural Colombia, but that the participants in this study should not expect to receive any direct benefits from their participation.

The questionnaire and its contents were explained to all present so that anyone not wishing to be interviewed could simply not participate. Very few displayed any reluctance to be interviewed. Those interviewed were chosen from the organization's list of members by selecting every other name on the roster. (Although a 50 percent sample was desired, as shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 22, sometimes a higher or lower percentage was achieved due to interviewing the leaders and/or the absence of group members). This selection was made by the union personnel, and as stated, the questionnaires contain the names of the respondents.

The campesinos were also told that the municipal and INCORA officials, banks, etc., would be visited and indeed much of the land tenure and credit data of the preceding chapters came from these sources. When and where possible landlords were also interviewed and this too was told to the campesinos.

After answering questions and reaching a consensus that there were no objections to this gringo intrusion, a round table discussion was held to relate the general chain of events involved in the land invasion. The interviewing of the members, the local government and INCORA officials, the banks, and the landlords took place on the succeeding days. Generally several weeks passed before all of the information was gathered for any one case.

In all, 14 cases of rural land invasions were studied⁴¹ during 1969 and 1970. The numbers assigned to the cases to be discussed are for identification purposes only; they bear no relationship either to the order in which they were studied or to the municipio numbers of Part II.

Some General Observations on Rural Land Invasions

Though all of the campesino groups interviewed in this study were in conflict with latifundistas over the rights to the land, this does not mean that all of the latifundistas had titles to the land in question. Indeed, several times the campesinos knew that they were occupying lands which were, in fact, part of the public domain. However, they also knew that, though public, certain latifundistas were claiming the land to be part of their farms.

Secondly, the term "rural land invasion" often, at least in the press or in popularized notions, conjures up some image of organized campesinos under a (red) banner engaged in a pitched battle, surrounding the owner's house, forcing him to flee, and leave behind his fields, cattle, belongings, etc. Such is not the case in Colombia. Land invasions and the ensuing conflicts do not take place over the entire haciendas. Those studied, and others briefly investigated always concerned only one part or section of a latifundio. Only in one case studied did the invaders occupy an entire section of land, and that section was unutilized and separated from the main hacienda by several kilometers

41. With the aid of a Colombian research assistant, my wife also joined in various discussions with the different groups and campesinos in 1970.

That the land was unutilized or utilized to a very low degree is also a very common characteristic of invaded lands. I never found a case, nor a landlord claiming it to be the case, that the invaded section had been utilized for crop cultivation, except where the crops had previously been grown by the invading campesinos themselves when they were renting the parcel. While most landlords claimed that they were about to intensively cultivate the now invaded parcel, or at least were about to clear and seed the land for improved pastures prior to the invasion, none had done so. Except for those cases where the ex-renters reoccupied their former plots, the most intensive utilization of the land took the form of only occasional use by the landlord's cattle herds for grazing on the natural vegetation. Such a fact is also borne out in those cases where INCORA intervened in the dispute. One of the first steps of INCORA's actions is to make an inspection trip to the area and some of its reports, for example, read as follows:

Number of cattle: 153, number of calves, 153.
 Area occupied by Invaders: 70 hectares = 17.5 percent.
 Area occupied by natural pastures abounding in high and dense weeds and disbursed silk cotton trees, balsum trees and vanilla trees and others: 330 hectares = 82.5 percent. Total area 400 hectares.⁴²

and

Number of Livestock: 0
 Area invaded: 40 hectares = 47 percent, planted to corn interspersed with other crops of about 6 weeks of age.

Decaying woodlands with medium weeds: 30 hectares = 35.3 percent,
 Natural primary woods; 15 hectares = 17.7 percent. Total area 85 hectares.⁴³

and:

Number of cattle: 25, calves, 7		
Natural pasture lands in poor to fair condition.....	170 hectares	47.5%
Seeded pasture lands in fair condition.....	21	" 6.0
Area occupied by invaders.....	36	" 10.0
Area in natural vegetation, woods, etc.....	130	" 36.4
Area cultivated.....	<u>0.5</u>	<u>" 0.1</u>
	357.5	100.0 ⁴⁴

A fourth characteristic of the invasions concerns the relatively small number of people involved in each group. As mentioned, the invasion did not

42. Files of INCORA, "Informe de Vista Previa, Predio: Lost Indios," Medellin, Colombia, Junio, 18, 1969.

43. Ibid., "Informe de Vista Previa, Predio: El Paraiso," Medellin, Colombia, Junio 16, 1969.

44. Ibid., "Informe de Visita a la Finca 'Rio Ciego,'" Cordoba, Bogotá, 16 Abril 1963.

follow a scenario of hordes of displaced-land hungry campesinos surrounding an entire hacienda. Rather, as shown in column (6) of Table 22, most of the cases studied consisted of only about 33 families, the largest single group numbered only 62 and the smallest only 4 families. Of course these are figures for the size of the groups at the time of the interviews. As time passed after an invasion some invaders sold their land "claims" to other members and moved on, as shown by a comparison of columns (4) and (5) of Table 22. Also these two columns show that in several cases new families joined in the effort after the initial invasion. While attrition and growth in the numbers occurred, the size of the original groups still only averaged 36 families.

Perhaps the relatively small size of these groups can be attributed to two factors: the first is the fact that customarily the coastal campesino is found living in small villages. Therefore, the very nature of the extent of his social contacts limits the size of these groups. Secondly, the logic of carrying out an act like an invasion simply precludes it from becoming a widespread item of note if the act is to succeed. The greater the number of people involved, the greater the possibility of the news of the impending invasion reaching the landlord involved.

The fifth characteristic of the invasion groups studied concerns how, though with innumerable local variations, the invasion itself was actually carried out. Among under or unemployed friends, the idea of occupying a parcel of land would be discussed for several months before any decision was taken. Sections of land were visited and inspected for availability of water, distance from the landlord's residence, likelihood of observation, etc. Since all of the invasions occurred near the villages of the campesinos involved, they were generally well acquainted with the terrain. The actual implementation of the invasion, as stated, was not a massive publicized event -- not so long as the campesinos could avoid detection. Before the invaders set up housekeeping on the parcels, the backyards of their present homes were intensively cultivated in seed beds with as many plants as possible. Cassava, plantains, as well as corn, beans, etc., would be started in these backyard plots with the intention of transplanting them to the new site later. Also, many of the larger yards would be utilized for constructing and letting "weather" the roofs, logs, and the poles of what would later become their rather rustic huts on the parcels.

The actual invasion would begin as secretly as possible. In the very early morning hours or late at dusk small groups or teams would enter the invasion site to stake out the individual parcels. Lookouts would be stationed to warn of passersby and/or persons known to be friendly to the landlord. After the parcels were staked out, members of the families would clear very small patches in the brush, and plant whatever seeds they could. Not all the brush was cleared out at this stage as the campesinos preferred to work unnoticed and hence unmolested as long as possible. For example all of the brush and woods would be left uncut along a roadside in order to reduce the probability of early detection.

If or when it was no longer possible to hide their activities the prefabricated sections of the rustic homes would be carried out to the invasion site to be hastily assembled. By this time, of course, the owners would have been notified and some form of expulsion proceeding initiated. When the invaders were sure that some official inspectors would be sent to their area to confirm

that an invasion had taken place, the small seedlings and plants would then be transplanted into their parcels from the backyards. Rarely, however, were any animals other than a few chickens brought to the invaded parcels at this time. The crops, plantain trees, etc., were transplanted in order to give the appearance that the parcels had been occupied for a longer time than in fact they had been. Though the transplanted crops rarely (if ever) fooled any inspectors, the official reports all noted the apparent age of the crops and of the slightly weathered huts. Therefore while the landlord would claim a more recent date of invasion, the invaders would try to plead that they be left on the land at least to harvest what they had "long ago" planted so that their labors would not have been in vain. Some form of this tactic was invariably tried in almost all of the cases studied -- though judges and/or officials with sympathetic ears were less commonly encountered.

Following their discovery some form of encounter with the law followed. In some cases, a small patrol of the army would be dispatched to the scene just to clear the invaders off the land. Other times the men would be rounded up and either taken to the municipal jail, or placed in a corral under guard for a few days; where, though food could be brought to them by their families, they would be exposed to the elements. In such cases, the local priests or area bishop might intervene to protest the inhumane treatment while in other cases the invaders would be released after a short time (never over a week was spent at any one time in such corrals) with a stern warning. In other cases the landlords would supply men and sometimes machinery to follow the rural police (carabineros) or army and tip over or perhaps burn the huts and uproot the crops.

While the following may well be an over generalization, it did appear that the violence with which the invaders were expelled from the land depended quite directly upon: a) the relative isolation of the invaded parcel; b) the local influence of the landlord; c) whether or not the army or the rural police were used to evict the people; and finally, d) whether or not it was the first, second, or third eviction. In general -- from the invasions and evictions observed, and from the reconstructed events of previous invasions studied by this author -- if this was the first time the invaders were being evicted from the land and if the army was called upon to do so, the invaders offered only passive resistance and were removed with some degree of restraint. This restraint diminished and the probability of incarceration and occasional beating increased with successive re-occupations and evictions, especially so if the rural police were involved. The rural police appeared to be much more directly under the influence and manipulation of the larger landowners than was the army. Perhaps the severity displayed by the two organizations is also a function of the nature of their members. The rural police in Colombia are professionals, whereas the army troops are young draftees -- themselves primarily sons of campesinos.

As intimated above, the invasion, eviction, and re-invasion cycle was also common to the cases studied. How many times the cycle was repeated depended of course on the dedication of the campesinos to win the struggle and the severity of their successive expulsions. However, with the increased repression of the campesinos and wider publicity and notoriety, increasingly the cry would be raised for someone to do something. Most often the task of

TABLE 22. Characteristics of Fourteen Rural Land Invasion Groups

Inva- sion Group No.	Principal Former Occupations of Members	Date of Inva- sion	Approxi- mate No. of Families Involved in Original Invasion	No. of Families in Groups at Time of Interviews	No. of Inter- views Con- ducted	Average Land Area Claimed at Time of Interviews per Family	Union Affilia- tion	Institution, and Form of Aid Received ...If Any
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
MOST SUCCESSFUL CASES: ¹								
1	Renters, colono- tenants + laborers	9-61	50	52	37	6.1	FANAL	Caja Agraria loans
2	Renters, fishermen	2-61	20	11	7	11.6	CTC	INCORA, super- vised credit, cattle cooperative
3	Colonist	{62} + {64}	16	12	7	22.8	CTS	INCORA, super- vised credit + technical aid
4	Renters, laborers	3-63	50	46	26	8.6	FANAL	" "
5	Renters, laborers	{66} + {69}	55	55	33	3.0	USUARIOS	INCORA, credit only

1. Have received some legal recognition of usufructuary rights to the land.

(continued)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
CASES WHICH HAD OCCUPIED THE LAND FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AT THE TIME OF INTERVIEWS:								
6	Rural + urban mix	3-63	26	11	9	34.0	CTC	INCORA, some credit
7	Renters, laborers	5-63	30	26	16	2.6	FANAL	---
8	Plantation workers	9-68	46	42	20	5.9	FANAL	---
CASES WHICH HAD OCCUPIED THE LAND FOR LESS THAN ONE YEAR AT THE TIME OF INTERVIEWS:								
9	Plantation workers	5-69	30	37	20	8.8	FANAL	---
10	Colono- tenants	9-69	20	13	8	14.0	CTC	---
11	Renters, laborers	11-69	63	62	34	undefined	FANAL	Caja Agraria, some credit
12	Renters, laborers	1-69	20	20	13	3.2	FANAL	---
SPECIAL CASES								
13	Stevedores	6-63	75	60	44	2.0	FANAL	Caja Agraria, some credit
14	Colono- tenants	---	8	4	4	6.7	CTC	---

acting fell to the land reform agency, which, as will be described, often tried a number of steps to ameliorate these disputes.

On the Classification of the Cases: How Can Success Be Measured:

Table 22 classifies the invasion cases studied into four categories: "the most successful cases"; "those where the invaders were on the land for more than one year"; "those where the land was occupied for less than one year"; and two "special cases." The conditional word "most" is used in the first category rather than simply "successful cases" because in none of the cases had the invaders achieved a title to the land.

Case 1 of the table is perhaps the most successful as measured by such a criterion since the members are now in the process of paying off the land mortgage which is held by the Caja Agraria. The land owner living in Bogotá -- who had never visited the land (it having been part of his inheritance) -- was almost relieved to learn that anyone even wanted the old family "white elephant." The early light skirmishes between the invaders and police were due more to an overzealous police official upholding the principle of the sanctity of private property rather than to a response to the owner's directives. Hence the owner sold some of the property to the union at a very favorable price with financing by the Caja Agraria and the remainder was bought by other large farmers.

The other four cases included in the most successful category are so classified by virtue of INCORA's intervention. In cases numbered 2 and 3 INCORA now owns the land and the former invaders enjoy the legal classification of INCORA asignatarios (assignees). In case 2 the invaders occupied a defunct government experiment station belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture which was, after a time, assigned to INCORA. In case 3 the invaders were originally colonists on public lands. Due to various legal manipulations, the land they were on was legally claimed by an entrepreneurial type who had them forcibly removed by the army. Several progressively more severe and finally bloody encounters ensued and when INCORA became involved it resolved the case by paying the entrepreneur for the improvements made on the land by the original colonists. The original colonists and others were then "reassigned" to the now public land, though not given titles.

In cases 4 and 5 INCORA is also the owner of the land, having purchased both properties after both expropriation and extinction of private domain proceedings failed. In case 4 the ex-renters invaded their former parcels after the administrator reneged on their collective rental contract and refused them reentry into the property. Though having occupied only their former 2-1/2 hectare parcels, as the years passed a number of the invaders divided and sold parts of their claims to the remaining and/or new members, while others began to encroach upon the remaining lands of the hacienda, while still others joined the original group of about 50 families. When INCORA finally (the entire negotiating and purchasing process took 4 years, 3 months, and 18 days) obtained the entire hacienda, the as yet noninvaded section was placed within the boundaries of a new irrigation district. The invaders are now part of a community farming enterprise on the irrigated lands, each being allocated 3 hectares of the commonly farmed irrigated lands. Hence the average size of the parcels now claimed by the invaders of 8.6 hectares includes the 3 hectares of irrigated

lands, plus the average size of the increased original plots. Since INCORA is committed to avoiding uneconomic fragmentation of minifundia it has not titled the 5-hectare parcels. In practice, the minimum land area INCORA will title is 15 hectares; thus over half the group would have to disoccupy their land so that INCORA could title the remaining parcels. This they have refused to do, although INCORA has promised that they would be the first to receive parcels elsewhere -- as soon as INCORA buys some more land. Hence at present the invaders of case 4 have the status of acomodados (acomodated; acomodados are INCORA legal documents recognizing a campesino's usufructuary rights to a property in general, but do not specify the boundaries of any particular parcel) and receive supervised credit from INCORA.

Case 5 is somewhat similar; too many families on too small a land area to receive titles or assignment so they too are "acomodated." During the most recent invasion attempt the invaders knew INCORA was trying to purchase the entire property. Therefore none have left the original group so all the invaders claim 3 hectares, mean, median, and mode, although with INCORA's subsequent purchase of the entire farm their parcels may be enlarged to meet the minimum 15-hectare limit.

Of those cases where the land has been occupied for more than one year, in cases 6 and 7, the time has been nearly 7 years. In case 6 a situation similar to case 4 has developed with many invaders selling off their claims to their compatriots and hence an average of 34 hectares is claimed -- considerably higher than the 11 hectares originally assigned each union member. Here INCORA has been trying to obtain the land -- without any success. Perhaps during the earlier days it appeared to INCORA's young lawyers that an easy prima facie case for expropriation existed, and in the meantime the invaders could receive some INCORA credit. Many of the more urban-oriented members of this group not only took these loans but also sold their land claims to fellow invaders for their cash-in-hand loans. Hence the rapid reconcentration of these original 11-hectare plots into average sized units of 34 hectares. INCORA then won an extinction of private domain suit -- having lost the expropriation case -- and began to give out acomodados to the invaders. However, the owner then appealed the case to the court of last resort on such matters, the Consejo de Estado (the Council of State). He won his appeal. But the invaders now had in their possession documents giving them rights of rather dubious legality to the land. To remedy this situation the INCORA lawyers then typed on to the office copies of the documents an additional statement stating to the effect that "person so-and-so is acomodated on such-and-such a parcel if INCORA wins the law suit." The campesinos were called into the office to re-sign these changed documents, which many refused to do. INCORA then rewrote all the acomodados with the special phrase in the text and added that if they lost the case, which they already had, the campesino agreed to move to other INCORA lands elsewhere. The signing of these new acomodados were made conditional to the invaders receiving any more credit. About half of the invaders again refused to sign and are refusing -- at last word -- to move.

In case number 7 the invaders have also been on the land for about 7 years. Here again INCORA tried to obtain the land through extinction of private domain but lost the case in 1966 on final appeal. The owner was so incensed at INCORA's temerity that he paid for the publishing of a twenty-page pamphlet containing the decision of the Consejo de Estado. He prefaced the pamphlet by stating in part:

I decided to make public the decision...because it studies the abusive acts of the invaders and the arbitrary procedures of INCORA...which were to declare my hacienda as abandoned lands ...[After all the work I put into them].

I hope that the professional invaders [i.e., the INCORA personnel] who get paid by the ordinary citizens...know that I have suffered incalculable damages from these vandalous acts...but yet there is justice in Colombia...and so the professional invaders [INCORA] had better be careful in the future.

In 1970 while the owner was campaigning for the senate from another part of the country, the Union started to publicize his fight with the campesinos. He suddenly became very amicable in the on-going negotiation with INCORA and sold the hacienda (although the adverse publicity ceased, he lost the election). The campesino invaders of course knew of the various processes and negotiations and had been continuously occupying the land for the past 3 years without any credit or (further) police intervention. Although their parcels are small these people may stand a good chance of becoming "assignees" since they only occupied a small portion of the hacienda -- all of which was sold to INCORA.

Cases 8 and 9 involve primarily former banana plantation workers. In 1964 the United Fruit Company began to invest heavily in the region, offering 5-year contracts to banana producers at a fixed price per box. Though some bananas were grown in the region before then, 1964 is approximately the "take off" date of the region's banana boom. In 1969 the company agreed to renew the contracts and sign new ones, but only at a 20 percent reduction in price. Hence the boom, which had attracted workers from the neighboring areas, began to fizzle as some early and less profitable plantations shut down, several planned new operations did not begin, and others began to reduce their operations. In sum, a considerable number of workers were discharged and the continually arriving new migrants added to the regions already surplus labor pool.

The invaders of case 8 were in one way rather fortunate: apparently the hacienda which claims the land is unable to produce a title showing that the invaded sector is actually encompassed within the hacienda's borders. While this fact has not completely stopped the occasional police harassment of the campesinos, neither has it brought any meaningful action on the part of INCORA to title the lands: again the parcels are too small and besides INCORA really just didn't want to become involved in the case. The region's director of INCORA put it this way:

Rural land invasions are not an agrarian problem, they are not a social problem, they are simply a police problem.

The invaders of case 9 were not so fortunate. In this case, harassment took the form of the local police chief and his men -- after having received permission from the owner -- using the parcel for target practice. While no one was killed then, the bullets whizzing overhead made crop cultivation a rather precarious occupation for the invaders. The plot of land which they occupied, though in an abandoned and overgrown state, had been purchased by the owner four years before the invasion. Since the Colombia Law 200 of 1936 clearly states that an owner has ten years before the land must be utilized before extinction of private domain proceedings can be implemented, INCORA is unable

to intervene. Besides, again there are too many people for the parcel to be subdivided into the minimum 15-hectare plots.

Since no ameliorative action was forthcoming from INCORA and since the local police were frequently incarcerating the people if they ventured into the town, the union made an agreement with the owner to abandon his lands in return for his paying them for the improvements and clearings they had made. However, on the day for turning the property over to the owner's lawyer, a faction of the union decided not to give up their plots. Since the deal was all or nothing, a fracas ensued, fighting broke out, and at least one reluctant-to-leave invader was killed and several others were wounded. The police, who happened to be standing ready nearby, then cleared the land of the invaders, jailed many (though all have since been released), and of course the money was not paid to the campesinos.

The invaders of case 10 were all formerly colono-tenants caught up in an age and region where such forms of tenancy are rapidly becoming outdated. No official actions have been taken by any agency in this case except by the governor of the department: previously the landlord had a small contingent of rural police stationed on his little-utilized property, which was sufficient to maintain his boundaries and keep the campesinos in line. After the invasion a particularly brutal beating was administered to one campesino invader by the troops. The injured man was taken to a sympathetic medical doctor in the capital city. Since such acts of violence must be reported when treated, the governor learned of the situation and had the police removed from the hacienda. Retribution by the owner is now practiced against the invaders principally in the form of cattle being driven in to graze on the campesinos' clearings and crops, a house burned down while left unguarded, etc. INCORA, though aware, has not entered the case simply because little can be done: the owner's title is secure; the invaders are clearly illegal. Besides, the local INCORA office, after a few initial successes in obtaining (by purchasing) land, is now much more concerned with and concentrates its efforts on the few assignees it has settled on some lands.

Our budget is too small, the courts and laws are against us and besides we have to prove the agrarian reform to be a success for the assignees before we can attempt to spread it out throughout the countryside.

Case 11 concerns invaders who occupy the flood plains of inland river swamp areas of the coast. Such lands are reserved by law for small-scale colonists, but apparently if a large land owner claims the land the law must be reaffirmed in each case. The invaders had divided up the river bank land into 57-meter frontages on the river, and each could plant as far back from the river as he desired. However the drier season brought down the cattle herds and campesinos were jailed for trespass. While interviewing this group, several campesinos and their pre-teenage sons were in jail. After several days an INCORA lawyer was able to secure their release on the basis of a legal technicality: a judge who lived in a far-off capital city and who did not have jurisdiction over land matters had written out an order "to jail anyone on Don _____'s land not there by his specific permission." Though such an unspecific and all-encompassing court order is not valid, the local judge reaffirmed it and the local police carried it out when accompanied by the administrator of the hacienda -- who, after all, would know if the land was part of the hacienda or not.

Whether or not INCORA will try to have the law reserving the river bottom lands for colonists applied to this case was under debate in the local INCORA offices. The last time the district INCORA offices took such a task (as in case 13), it took three years for the resolution to be officially certified by INCORA's internal organization and nearly three more years of appeals, etc., before it was finally applied.

In the meantime the struggle continues as the campesinos try to chase out the cattle herds while at the same time trying to avoid apprehension by the police and to cultivate their crops. Indeed the struggle must continue -- for though this was the first year that they occupied these particular swamp lands, the upland parcels they had formerly rented from small- to medium-sized landholders are now becoming quite difficult to find. The owners of the farms which used to (and to a certain extent still do) rent parcels to the people now claim that the land is needed for their growing families, sons-in-law, etc. Also many of these owners are now a bit apprehensive about the possibility of INCORA affecting their properties because of their renting out small parcels.

Case 13 presents a rather confused situation: well over half of the invaders had previously worked on the hacienda involved, either as renters or as laborers. The owner began to discharge the people in order to convert the hacienda into pasture lands. After one cultivation season had passed -- during which the displaced campesinos found little employment -- they reoccupied their former parcels. Two police actions followed, the first in response to the owner's demands and the second at the behest of a neighboring latifundista. This neighbor thought the owner to be weakening in his resistance to the campesinos' second invasion, and did not want any dangerous precedents set in the area. Indeed the owner was weakening to the extent that he began to negotiate with INCORA to buy the invaded portion of the hacienda. INCORA, however, is only interested if the entire hacienda is for sale, again mainly because the plots are too small to meet the minimum criterion of 15-hectare family farms.

The situation has now become more intricate because it appears that "the owner" is only one of several owners of the hacienda -- some of whom do not want to sell any of the land, others of whom will sell if the invaders first disoccupy, and still others who will sell any or all of the land as quickly as possible. At last word this case continues to muddle on with the campesinos still on their parcels.

Finally the special cases are unique because in neither case were the invaders on the land when interviewed. Case 13 involved the older colonotnants removed from their parcels by the proprietress. Case 14, like case 11, involved river bottom lands or flood plains. The invaders were all ex-dock workers or stevedores. The town had previously been a transshipment point between river barges and a railroad. When the government closed the railroad these men were without work and they subsequently occupied the nearby river bottom lands. The six-year legal battle by INCORA to have the national law applied to this case did not completely calm the local scene -- one of the local landlords claiming the lands was the father of the departmental governor. Hence the rural police and army were used quite liberally in the continual

evictions of the invaders. It was not until a new governor was appointed that the invaders enjoyed relatively unmolested use of the land and some were able to receive loans from the Caja Agraria.

The short time of unmolested cultivation was soon disrupted however. The lands were actually below the river level but protected by a dike which also protected a corner of one of the landlord's properties (though the vast majority of his land was on higher ground). While dredges are common on the river to keep the shipping channels open, one day (for the first time in history) a dredge cut through part of the dike and the water flowed over into the lower lands. However, since the landlord's terrain is higher than that occupied by the invaders the water flowed down to the lowest part, completely covering the invaders' crop lands. The landlord lost little because water covered just a small corner of his property. Those who have a lake permanently covering their fields have a different perspective.

The dredging company has not responded to the outcry of the campesinos to repair the dike and pump out the water, and neither has anyone else. INCORA has a large project on the other side of the river -- in the next department -- but that project director's responsibility stops at the water's edge. The municipio used to be included in the department-wide INCORA zone of operations in the early 1960s. However a new INCORA parcelation and irrigation project has been started several municipios away from this locality and now all of the reform agency's efforts and responsibilities are directed towards the project. Since 1969 none of the INCORA maps of "zones of responsibility" include this municipio.

In summary, then, each case does have almost unique characteristics when viewed as a process on the micro level. The degree of success is difficult to measure in absolute terms though, as mentioned, some cases can be thought of as more successful than others as some campesinos gain -- if not titles -- at least some degree of usufructuary access to the land. While the general classification of cases is not absolutely precise, the following section will attempt to analyze some of the common attributes of the various categories.

On the Men Involved

Rural land invasions are not characteristically carried out by young men.⁴⁵ As shown by Table 23, most all the men involved were at least in their mid to late 30s or early 40s -- with the exception of the group of displaced stevedores and ex-colono-tenants. At the time of the invasion, the age of the campesinos varied between 21 and 78 years, and the average age of the groups ranged from 33.1 to 54.2 years.

45. Although men were the heads of the families, each group had at least one female head of family. These women always were pointed out to the author with great pride by the union members and there were always sufficient young sons or wards under their charge to ensure a labor force for the parcel.

Table 23. More Characteristics of Fourteen Rural Land Invasion Groups

Inva- sion Group No.	Average Age of Family Head at Time of Invasion	AT THE TIME OF INTERVIEWS							
		Average No. in Family	Extended Families of Percent of Group Families	Land Area Claimed (Has.)	Land Area Culti- vated (Has.)	Total Family Income (Pesos)	Income from the Sale of Farm Products		
							Average Amount (Pesos)	Percent of Total	Divided by No. of Cultivated Hectares
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
MOST SUCCESSFUL CASES:									
1	40.1	8.3	38	6.1	3.1	12,219	8,498	69.5	2,741
2	46.3	7.8	28	11.6	2.1	9,829	5,508	56.0	2,622
3	41.2	10.6	42	22.8	5.8	11,294	---	---	---
4	41.6	8.3	46	8.6	7.4	11,792	8,669	73.5	1,171
5	41.5	7.2	36	3.0	2.0	7,523	4,452	59.2	2,226
(Weighted Averages)	(41.3)	(8.1)	(40)	(7.2)	(3.9)	(10,498)	(7,042)	(67.4)	(1,867)
CASES WHICH OCCUPIED THE LAND FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AT TIME OF INTERVIEW									
6	38.1	11.1	33	34.0	4.0	14,643	9,638	65.8	2,409
7	33.1	7.8	36	2.6	2.4	6,983	5,731	82.1	2,388
8	38.1	7.7	60	5.9	3.5	8,175	5,567	61.2	1,590
(Weighted Averages)	(35.1)	(8.4)	(46)	(10.3)	(3.2)	(9,045)	(6,439)	(71.2)	(2,006)
CASES WHICH OCCUPIED THE LAND FOR LESS THAN ONE YEAR AT TIME OF INTERVIEW									
9	39.3	6.3	50	8.8	1.4	7,359	2,500	33.9	1,785
10	45.0	8.2	37	14.0	1.2	9,770	---	---	---
11	43.0	6.9	35	---undefined---		8,497	4,040	47.5	---
12	40.1	7.8	25	3.2	2.1	6,723	2,855	42.4	1,360
(Weighted Averages)	(41.7)	(6.8)	(37)	(8.0)	(1.58)	(8,022)	(3,530)	(42.9)	(1,575)
SPECIAL CASES									
13	51.6	7.2	52	2.0	--	9,656	3,796	39.3	---
14	54.2	4.0	25	6.7	--	4,500	0	--	---

With their years most of the invaders had held several different types of employment⁴⁶ in various localities, though the overwhelming majority had been either some form of agricultural tenant or laborer.⁴⁷ Over 25 percent of the invaders had previously migrated either to one of the major cities of the coast in search of urban employment or to Venezuela for agricultural employment. However, except for the two cases of ex-banana plantation workers, nearly all of the invaders were born in the same municipio where the invasion occurred, or in neighboring municipios.

In sum, then, the invader may be characterized as either an agricultural tenant or laborer who has sought employment elsewhere and has been frustrated in this attempt, and is about 40 years of age. He has found rural jobs and opportunities increasingly scarce. Hence he has banded together with fellows of his native area who were in similar situations to do what he knows best: till the soil.

And their Families

While all but one of the invasion groups had families of larger average size than the typical rural Colombian family,⁴⁸ the families of the first two categories were on the average larger than those of the more recently arrived groups. The age factor of the head of the family though negatively correlated with family size,⁴⁹ is not, to my mind, the best explanatory variable of the size of these families. Three other inter-related variables would be better used to explain these size differentials: the amount of land claimed, the security of the occupancy of that land, and, finally, an examination of the nature of the families themselves.

First, there is a relatively high correlation between the number of hectares claimed by the invaders and the size of their families.⁵⁰ Of course to a certain

46. Eighteen percent had always been engaged in only one occupation, 42 percent had held two types of jobs, and 33 percent had held three.

47. Fourteen prior types of agricultural employment were mentioned by the invaders.

48. The average size of the rural Colombian family is 6.4 members. See V. Gutierrez de Pienada, La Familia en Colombia, Serie Socio-economica no. 7 (Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1962).

49. $R = -.439$, indicating of course that the younger households had the larger families, or that the sons, etc., of the older households had moved on by the time of the interviews. Of course this correlation and those which will follow must be viewed with caution due to the small number of groups involved. They are made only to give an estimate of the relationship.

50. $R = .667$

degree this could be expected: the larger the farm the greater its ability to support more people. However, if just the land area cultivated is correlated with average family size, the relationship is reduced.⁵¹ The reason why this latter relationship is less than the former lies in the organization of the agricultural enterprises established by these campesinos.

While all but one of the invasion groups studies were primarily crop cultivators at the time of the interviews, the noncultivated sections of their parcels were not left idle. For those who could afford them, cattle would graze on either seeded pastures or more frequently on the natural vegetation. More often burros, pigs, chickens, ducks, turkeys, and other fowl would be found foraging on these sections of the parcels. Though cattle are the most desired animal to own -- they give some measure of the status of a cattleman to the owner -- the other animals are also vital to the campesinos since they can easily be sold for cash in times of need.

What would better explain family size, would be a nonquantifiable variable, that of the perceived security of the continued occupation of the land. If land is held in the belief that it will continue to belong to the family, this perceived security allows for the support of increased numbers of people. Hence in the first two categories the size of the family is larger than among the more recently arrived families, who were less secure in their land claims at the time of interviewing.

Of course there are considerable variations between the invasion groups in each category. For example, group 5 is included among the most successful cases because it had been given some legal recognition of its claims to the land by INCORA. However, it had only recently gained such a status, and, as shown in the table, the average size of its families is the smallest of that category. Similarly, case 6, though now with rather tenuous legal (if any) claims to their parcels, were and are determined to remain, whatever INCORA does with the documents, and its families are the largest of that category.

Finally, there is the nature of the families involved. Briefly, as shown by column (4) of Table 23, a greater percentage of the families in the more secure categories consisted of extended families. While the differences between the categories are not great on the measure, again the general pattern should be expected to hold: greater security to the occupation of the land allows for more mouths to be fed and hence families grow as more relatives, grandparents, etc., are added to the social unit.

On the Size of Parcels

A comparison of the average size of parcels shows that the most successful category actually has smaller parcels than do the other groups on the average. Of course to a certain degree this might be expected: if one is claiming the land, why not claim as much as possible? However, again it must be recognized that there are wide variations between the groups in each category. Both cases 2 and 3, in which the campesinos enjoy the status of "assignees" have

51. $R = .254$

the largest land areas in their category. Though group 2 does not have the 15-hectare minimum size limit demanded by INCORA for a "family farm," settlers are also organized into a cattle-raising cooperative. The cattle graze on lands which are neither assigned to the group nor to individuals but held by INCORA and hence are not included in the 11.6 hectare size of the individual parcels. Groups 4 and 5 are accommodated by INCORA, though the small parcels of group 5 reduces the weighted average size of this category (if group 5 was eliminated from the category the average size parcel would be 8.96 hectares). After INCORA's purchase of the entire hacienda involved in case 5 and if the land is parceled out among the invaders, the average size of their plots may increase to the minimum 15-hectare size necessary for titles. The union and the Caja apparently do not have such qualms about a minimum 15 hectares and, as mentioned, the campesinos of case 1 are busy paying off their mortgages.

The three groups which were on the land for more than one year have, on the weighted average, the largest claimed land area -- though this is principally due to the influence of group 6, within which there has been a considerable consolidation of the original 11-hectare plots. The more recent invasion groups appear to claim about 8-hectare plots, but again such a measure must be viewed with caution due to the wide variation between the groups and the fact that a land area cannot be defined for group 11.

In sum, therefore, when land is occupied or invaded by campesinos, they do not appear to make extravagant land claims. While most campesinos would like to expand their farm sizes -- principally to become cattle ranchers rather than tillers of the soil -- the invaders can hardly be termed greedy in terms of the land area they try to claim. Only two groups (3 and 6) actually were claiming a land area sufficient by INCORA's criterion to qualify as a family-sized unit; members of one of these had increased their original area by buying out their fellow invaders over the years. Of course, while ecological and organizational factors (e.g., the cattle herd held in common by group 2 which grazes on INCORA land) obviously affect the minimum land area necessary, the campesinos land claims vis à vis INCORA's general criterion appear to be quite modest.

On the Cultivated Land Area

This modesty of the size of land claims is perhaps most directly related to what a campesino family is able to farm, given their traditional hoe and machete implements, regional customs, and the quality and quantity of institutional aid received. Therefore, as would be expected, the groups in the most successful category have the largest cultivated area followed by the other two categories in succession. The two groups with the most area cultivated both are under INCORA's tutelage. In each of these two cases INCORA has organized the assigned and accommodated campesinos into experimental group-farming enterprises on part of the lands where several crops are grown. Modern agricultural practices and machinery are utilized on the common fields under the direction of the reform agency's technicians. The campesinos are organized into quasi-formal cooperatives, supposedly to approve the production plans, receive instruction in the techniques of modern agricultural practices, etc. In reality, these cooperatives are rather extraneous to the production decisions and operations except to provide and coordinate the labor supply when it is needed, and to collect the profits from the enterprise -- if and when they are distributed.

Group 3 for example was (at the time of the interview) hopelessly embroiled in a bureaucratic jumble as to calculating costs and profits on an assortment of previous cooperative cropping enterprises. Cotton had been grown the preceding year but due to many problems only one-half of the profits had yet been distributed. The needed machinery for this year's crops was unavailable or only available after the correct planting season had passed for several crops. The large landlords of the region succeeded in tying up the machinery at the critical times by long-term contracts. At the time of interviews, the dry season was fast approaching and though the field was plowed and fertilized, nothing had been planted. Against the better judgment of most of the campesinos a bean crop was about to be planted, though the weeds were sprouting at an unprecedented rate.⁵² In fairness to INCORA it must be emphasized that the campesinos were receiving various payments, loans, etc., which kept them well above minimum subsistence levels. However, because of the intricate accounting devices the author was unable to calculate what income came from past farm sales and what part from advances or labor services rendered, etc. Neither were the INCORA officials.

Group 5, though similarly farming some lands cooperatively, had a much better record in its cooperative efforts. The only discontentment within the group occurred in the past years when the campesinos were assigned individual sections within the common field which they were to keep free of weeds, etc. Of course the problem arose that some invested more effort in their sections than others, but the harvest profits were divided equally. Since then all the cooperative's members work on a rotating basis throughout the entire field. Also, many of the members of this group have adopted on their home parcels some of the more modern practices taught by the technicians, principally those of the use of hybrid seeds and insecticides.

The other groups demonstrate more realistically the typical land area cultivated without the aid of mechanization -- though it must be emphasized that the larger land areas of the two cases just described should in no way be construed as reflecting the marginal increment or effect of mechanization on the ability to place a greater land area under cultivation. They were, and should be recognized as, only small-scale experiments.

The cultivated area -- though difficult to measure precisely since all the groups followed the common practice of interplanting their crops among each other⁵³ (except in the cooperative fields) -- is closely related to the degree

52. See R. E. Soles, "Comments on Planning Future Irrigation Projects in the Rio Cesar Region of Colombia," mimeo. Prepared for USAID, Bogotá, 1970.

53. For example cultivated plots may be scattered throughout a parcel of land in order to avoid having to remove fallen tree trunks, dense thickets of brush, etc. Also within each plot may be found 2 plants of cassava, 10 plants of corn, a number of bean plants, plus the seedlings of a fruit tree or two, etc. The beans are harvested first, then the corn and after a year or so the cassava. The plot may be reseeded or left for the fruit trees to mature. Hence the summation of these plots into "field areas" is only an estimate as the campesino may claim that he has x hectares cultivated, but closer inspection reveals large gaps of dense brush and trees within that area.

of success of the group and the length of time it has occupied the land. Simply put, the longer and more securely the land is held, the greater the area which can be utilized -- up to the limits of the human ability to keep the land cleared. Group 6, though not heavily favored by INCORA as of late, had the largest area cleared and planted, but also had occupied their parcels for the longest time period of their category. They also had the largest families to share in the work. There is the further complicating factor of groups which reoccupied their formerly rented parcels. In general, however, there does appear in the table a near direct relationship between the success of the group and the amount of land in cultivation.

On the Concepts of Income, Farm Production, and Well-Being

Compared to the average rural family, the invaders of the more successful categories appear to be rather well-off. The generally accepted figure for average rural family income in Colombia is about 8,000 pesos for a family of 6.4 members. The average gross cash incomes for the families of two top categories of the table are 9,000 to over 10,000 pesos. Although the invaders' families are larger than the more typical rural family, the difference in the absolute levels between the invaders' and the average families' incomes may well mask the true success of the former. The national average figure includes all the rural families and hence is based on the highly skewed rural income distribution where the top 10 percent of the rural income earners receive over 50 percent of the rural income. The income among the rural invasion families, however, is much more evenly distributed and their average figures portray to a much greater degree the reality of their situations.

While both the levels of gross cash incomes and the levels of incomes generated by the sale of farm products are directly related to the degree of success of each invasion category, the proportion of the total family income generated by the sale of farm products is not so correlated. To a broad degree there is the expected relationship of the more established families receiving a larger share of their cash income from the sale of farm products (67 and 71 percent versus 42 percent). However, the groups of the most successful category receive a slightly lower proportion of their total family incomes from their parcels than do the less favored group. Why this holds, at least for the cases studied, may be explained as follows: in all of the cases some members of the families occasionally worked elsewhere at various tasks for which they received cash payments. Most frequently it is the older sons who hire out as laborers to other farmers; less frequently the head of the family also works in the surrounding area to supplement the family's cash income, especially during the off seasons.

Extra cash incomes were not solely generated by the males of the families, however; especially if the invasion group was located on or near a thoroughfare or town, the women were frequently found to be making small tid-bits of food to sell -- which were hawked by the smaller children in the streets, gathering places, markets, etc. In other cases the women also were employed as laundresses or some were the everpresent market women of Latin America, buying and re-selling in small lots at whatever mark-up the market or prospective buyer would bear. In summary then, gross cash incomes generated either on or off the farms may be a very dubious criterion to judge the degree of success of the rural land invader.

Likewise, as noted earlier, the column entitled "farm sales income divided by number of cultivated hectares" must also be viewed with caution if it is to be interpreted as a measure of productivity. While the more secure groups score higher on this measure, in the uncultivated sections of the parcels a cow or two may roam if the family is fortunate, or more typically pigs, chickens, ducks, turkeys are found foraging in the bush. This measure was calculated for the table and this note of caution placed here only to warn against making such over generalizations.

In summary, then, even though the more secure invader families do earn greater cash incomes and a greater proportion of that income is generated by the sale of products from their farms, caution must be exercised in claiming that such measures adequately reflect the level of welfare or well being of the families. Why? Simply because the farms also produce a great deal which does not enter the market, but rather is consumed on the farm by the family members. If an income could be imputed to these products so generated and self consumed, undoubtedly the level of family welfare would rise higher than indicated merely by the cash incomes now received. For this reason and because the size of the extended families is positively related to the security of land occupancy, per capita income measures were not computed. It is doubtful whether such a calculation would contribute much towards a meaningful concept of well-being.

In Summary

The invasion groups studied do fit the characteristics of the previous chapters. Most of the groups were principally comprised of former agricultural tenants, laborers, and colonists who found gainful employment increasingly difficult to come by. Many had migrated throughout the coastal region or major urban areas in search of employment -- many even had travelled to Venezuela in their pursuit of jobs. Having sought or taken various jobs throughout their earlier years, the typical invader by the time of his joining in the collective action of occupying a parcel of unutilized land was not a young man, rather most were well into their mid 30s or early 40s.

Though knowingly engaged in an illegal act -- or at least knowing that someone held a title to or claimed that land -- the invaders were rather modest in their claims to the land. This modesty is due to a combination of factors, mainly the number of families involved and the extent of the area occupied. Having democratically subdivided the land involved, few invader families succeeded in cultivating their entire parcels, though the extent of their cultivations is largely due to the security and time span of their occupancy, as well as in certain cases the degree of mechanized-institutional aid received. As their security to the land increases along with the time spent on the land, the size of the families increases as members of the extended family join together, since there is at least an assured food supply. Similarly, with greater perceived security of tenure, so too does the cash incomes of the families increase so a greater proportion of that income is generated by the sale of farm products, as there is a greater intensification of land use. Though such quasi-productivity, and cash measures of well-being must be viewed with caution, they do indicate that for many of the invaders the basic question of how they will provide for their subsistence needs has been resolved.

IV. A CONSIDERATION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS

While the cases presented in this study do indicate that although at least some campesinos have been able to resolve their basic problem of subsistence in the wake of the modernization and mechanization process by implementing their own agrarian reform, many have not been so fortunate and continue to exist in a precarious state. The question now arises as to what policy implications and measures are derived from this analysis and these cases?

This study has tried to show the complexity of factors behind the causes of rural unrest.⁵⁴ Similarly, development is a complex task. However, given the general scarcity of resources and trained manpower which characterizes underdevelopment, to a certain degree, simplicity and directness in attacking the root problems should be a major guideline in formulating policies and implementing programs. Simplicity and directness serve not to minimize the complexity of the tasks at hand, but rather to generate more immediate and attainable solutions to the growing and urgent problems at hand. Grandiose and complex schemes have a long history of consisting of only holiday rhetoric; implementation of such plans generally suffers from the inevitable time lag between words and deeds. Within a framework of realistic expectations and capabilities the following are a few general policy recommendations which should be considered.

First, attention should be given to the very process of rural development itself. Given the situation of a large and growing rural population which is finding minimal subsistence opportunities increasingly difficult to encounter, Colombia must address itself to the question of the benefits of its present strategy of rural modernization via capital-intensive techniques versus the benefits of a strategy which allows for a wider and more meaningful participation by the campesinos. While this study has pointed out the capital-intensive cultivation of cotton as one of the principal forces uprooting a great number of people from their traditional sources of rural employment, the entire spectrum of how rural development is to take place must be considered. If the promises of the green revolution are to be fulfilled, it will depend on who implements it and how it is implemented. If its advantages accrue primarily to those who already control the resources and/or the capital, the gap between the few haves and the many have-nots is sure to widen. In short, while capital-intensive technology and modernization can produce a facade of development, a development strategy which chooses a path of greater utilization of labor can meaningfully employ a greater number of people and thus include them in its progress.

Of course a strategy of development which includes and employs the majority of persons in Colombia's rural sector also means that a greater number of people must be allowed access to the primary resource of rural production -- the land. While this study has pointed out some of the shortcomings of the agrarian reform agency, this should not be construed as reflecting adversely upon the people who work within it. For, as they work within INCORA, they also work within the restrictive and inhibiting legal structure governing their actions. For

54. Cf., Soles, "Rural Land Invasions in Colombia," Chap. 3, "Toward A More General Theory of Peasant Unrest."

example, the legal codes governing INCORA as they are reflected in the administrative procedures show the following number of administrative procedures or steps the agency must follow:

To buy a land area.....	116
To parcel out land.....	113
To title public lands.....	71
To extinguish private domain.....	69
To expropriate land.....	52
To certify the existence of renters, etc., on the land...	42.55

Hence while the legal mandate of the agrarian reform agency is surely in need of change, the direction of the agency's actions is also in need of change. In essence, the efforts of INCORA must be redirected from photogenic irrigation and parcelation show-case projects utilizing the most modern and mechanized processes where a few fortunate campesinos reside, to efforts which encompass a far greater number of rural persons so that they too can obtain access to the land and thus become included in the productive and development processes.

Concomitant to allowing a greater number of rural people to secure access to the land, they must also be assured of a means to participate in the development process. In short, to allow them access to an ongoing economic process the people must be able to reach the markets. Hence a massive program of building a network of rural feeder roads should be considered as vital and necessary.

Finally, there are the supportive institutions which must be revitalized, changed, and reoriented towards serving the campesinos of Colombia -- or in some cases, simply begun. While a great deal remains to be done concerning such service institutions, there does exist one such institution which is widespread throughout the countryside and could be further redirected towards serving those who it already claims to be its clientele. That is, of course, the Caja Agraria. The credit needs of the campesinos are great, and the Caja could be reorganized to more effectively meet these needs in order to truly become "El amigo del campesino."⁵⁶

In short, while the policy ramifications of this study are numerous and many, the basic conditions and processes which produce rural unrest can, and should be dealt with in a direct and straight-forward manner. To avoid costly and time-consuming errors while the problems grow in intensity, the policies and programs should be simple, broad-reaching, and begun immediately.

55. INCORA, "Sistematizacion y Proceso" (internal organizational flow charts) (Bogotá).

56. The Caja has recently "reorganized," again reaffirming its campesino orientation. See Small Farmer Credit in Colombia; USAID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, Country Papers, vol. 5, (Feb. 1973), no. SR 105.